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Using a variety of economic models, the Commission services have examined the impact of 
several reforms forming part of the Growth and Jobs Strategy (GJS). Overall, the results show 
that past reforms have delivered significant benefits, and that further reforms in key areas 
could generate important additional gains. The modelling results provide support for the 
existence of positive interactions between structural reforms in different areas, and thus for 
having a comprehensive reform strategy. They also highlight spillovers between reforms at 
EU and national level, the magnitude of which is being enhanced through the growing 
intensity of trade and investment. 
 
Labour and product markets are at the core of the reform agenda. It is estimated that reforms 
in areas such as unemployment benefits, taxes and the ease of entry for new firms have 
reduced the structural unemployment rate by almost 1.4 p.p. and boosted GDP in the EU15 by 
2% since 1995. This positive outcome partly stems from the interaction of product market 
reforms on job creation (i.e. by facilitating wage moderation and the entry of new firms to 
markets). These results would have been even higher if the simulation took account of the 
positive impact of the reforms on the participation rate. 
 
Between 2000 and 2005, the employment rate of older workers (aged 55 to 64) in EU 15 
increased by 6 p.p. to 44% and the effective retirement age rose by more than one year: this 
represents considerable progress towards the goal of a 50% employment rate for older 
workers by 2010. Analysis carried out at EU level on the economic and budgetary impact of 
ageing populations confirms that a considerable share of this increase is due to past reforms of 
pension and early retirement systems. It also projects that by 2025, the employment rate of 
older workers will rise to close to 60% and effective retirement ages will go up by one more 
year: approximately, one third of these gains will result from the lagged phasing-in of enacted 
pension reforms. An alternative set of simulations examines the economic gains from a one 
year increase in the effective retirement age: as a result of increased labour supply and a lower 
tax burden, this would bring about a rise of almost 1.5% in GDP by 2025 and 2.5% by 2050 
in the EU15.  
 
A central aim of the revised strategy for Growth and Jobs Strategy is to better align reform 
efforts at EU and national level, not least by giving full effect to the internal market 
programme. A recent analysis, carried out as part of the on-going review of the Internal 
Market, shows that past efforts to deepen the internal market, coupled with its extension to the 
EU10 economies following enlargement, have been an important source of jobs and growth. 
Over the period 1992-2006, the achievement of an enlarged Internal Market is estimated to 
have resulted in a 2.2% increase in the EU25 GDP and the creation of 2.75 million additional 
jobs (equivalent to a 1.4% increase in total employment). The analysis also confirms that 
these gains could be doubled with the removal of remaining Internal Market barriers. 
 
The need for continuing with ambitious reform efforts is demonstrated in simulations showing 
that higher R&D expenditure can lead to an enhanced economic performance. In spring 2006, 
Member States announced country-specific targets for R&D expenditure amounting to 2.7% 
of EU25 GDP by 2010 from the current level of 1.9%. If Member States achieve their targets, 
R&D activities will rise by 50% in 2025 generating—through technological progress—an 
increase of between 2.6% and 4.4% in GDP on the basis of conservative assumptions.     6
Moreover, as technological progress benefits from the R&D activities elsewhere, there are 
large benefits from spillovers across countries and sectors. International spillovers account for 
some 25-30% of the overall effect on GDP for the EU25, with their scale depending upon the 
intensity of trade across countries. This points to potential synergies between R&D policy and 
internal market measures that increase market opening and therefore magnify R&D spillovers. 
 
Efforts are underway to reduce costs for European businesses in complying with 
administrative requirements laid out in national and European legislation. General 
administrative compliance costs have been estimated at 3.5% of GDP for the EU25. The 
effect of a gradual reduction by 25% between 2006 and 2010 of the administrative burdens for 
businesses related to these is estimated at 1.1% additional GDP for the EU25 by 2010, which 
mainly results from boosting labour efficiency as workers undertaking such administrative 
tasks are freed up to carry out more productive activities. The full economic effect unfolds 
over time through subsequent capital accumulation reaching 1.3% by 2015. The impact of this 
cost reduction would be quite diverse across Member States, reflecting the level of the 
administrative burden in each country. A separate modelling exercise for the EU15 shows the 
competition enhancing effects induced by the potential entry of new firms, a channel that 
could lead to a significant additional GDP increase over the long-run. 
 
This exercise relies upon different methodologies and data sources, and as for all modelling 
exercises, caution must be exercised in interpreting the results as each model has its strengths 
and weaknesses and does not take all economic aspects into account. In particular, no single 
model encompass all potentially important policy reform measures which contribute to 
growth and employment.     7
1. Introduction 
 
Europe has a clear challenge.  It has far too few jobs and a sustainable growth rate that is just 
too slow. Product and labour markets do not seem to be flexible enough. Too much regulation 
seems to be tying hands of Europe's businesses. Investment in knowledge creation and its 
further use in production are insufficient.  Nevertheless, there is broad agreement about the 
way to meet Europe's challenge. Comprehensive structural reforms that tackle the frictions 
braking Member States' economies need to be implemented. 
The implementation of the reform agenda needs to be accompanied by a thorough economic 
analysis of the impact of the reform measures. This concerns their potential to boost growth 
and generate jobs in the countries undertaking these reforms and in the EU as a whole. 
Quantitative analysis making use of state-of-art modelling tools can provide useful insights 
about the plausible size of growth and employment effects of such reforms, about the nature 
and length of the adjustment process following the introduction of a reform, and about the 
possible spillover effects across countries and reform areas.  
This paper presents results of the model-based simulations, undertaken in a joint exercise of 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and Directorate General for 
Enterprise and Industries, conducted with an aim to provide answers to some of these issues. 
These simulations also served as an input into the 2007 Annual Progress Report. The focus of 
the paper is on several areas covered by the Growth and Jobs strategy (GJS). They are not, 
however, intended as an assessment of reforms currently being undertaken in Member States 
or at Community level. This exercise should rather be seen as a first step towards building up 
the analytical capacity necessary for better understanding effects of structural reforms. The 
analysis presented in this paper cover the following areas:  
•  labour and product market reforms; 
•  pension reforms aiming at increases in effective retirement age; 
•  the completion of the Internal Market; 
•  reductions in administrative burden; and  
•  increases in R&D spending. 
This list does not cover all the types of reform measures which are being implemented as part 
of the GJS and which can potentially contribute to growth and jobs. The choice was 
determined by the importance of given areas for growth and jobs as well as the suitability of 
the modelling tools used. Where possible, several models and modelling approaches were 
used so as to provide a range of results, which better takes into account the uncertainty around 
the results and allows for assessing the robustness of the results.  
These results combine a set of simulations using several versions of the QUEST model (a 
macroeconometric model developed by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs) and WorldScan (a computable general equilibrium model developed at the CPB, 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, and used by Directorate General for 
Enterprise and Industries). In addition, econometric analysis of effects of structural reforms 
on unemployment was undertaken. It is important to keep in mind that this exercise relies 
upon different methodologies and data sources, and as for all modelling exercises, caution 
must be exercised in interpreting the results as they have their strengths and weaknesses.     8
The technical features of the employed models and the nature of the exercises also determined 
the geographical coverage of the exercise. To the extent possible the focus was on EU25 and 
country-specific results were produced. However, results produced with the latest versions of 
the QUEST model (a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model) cover the 
EU15 aggregates only. Currently, the model is being further developed to extend its coverage 
to the whole EU25 and to allow for country specific analysis. In addition, the backward-
looking part of the exercise examining the effects of past reforms in labour and product 
markets focused solely on the EU15 countries. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the areas covered in the simulations, modelling approaches 
used and the coverage of the exercises. 
 
Table 1: Overview of model simulations 
Area Modelling  approach  Coverage 





Effective retirement age  ECFIN ageing model  EU15 aggregate 
Internal Market  QUEST II  EU25 aggregate 









2. The effects of past labour and product market reforms 
 
2.1 The effects of policy shocks on the unemployment rate - 
econometric simulations 
 
This section presents econometric simulations of policy induced changes in the 
unemployment rate. Calculations are based on the baseline specifications of the 
unemployment rate equation estimated for the revised OECD job strategy (Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006). The simulations are based on an aggregate unemployment rate equation 
estimated for all the OECD countries. They do not consider the effects of labour market 
reforms on the employment and/or the participation rates. Nevertheless they provide a useful 
indication of the likely aggregate effects of structural reforms on the labour market. A part of 
these results then serves as an input into the modelling exercise presented in the section 2.2. 
The main results can be summarised as follows. First, the change in the tax wedge, in the 
replacement rate and in the product market regulation over the period 1995-2003 contributed 
to a decline in the structural unemployment rate of about 0.8 percentage points. This figure is 
based on the change in the tax wedge based on national accounts data. In contrast, when the 
                                                 
1    Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom.     9
change of the tax wedge for specific family types is taken as representative of the whole 
population, the fall in the structural unemployment rate is much larger (about 2 percentage 
points). 
Second, if one considers only the changes in the policy variables that contribute to a decline in 
the unemployment rate (e.g. a decline in the tax wedge - based on national accounts data - and 
in the replacement rate, shorter benefit duration, less regulated product markets), the decline 
in the structural unemployment rate amounts to 1.2 percentage points.  
2.1.1 Methodology 
 
To identify the role of policies and institutions, a static reduced form was estimated by 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) over the period 1982-2003 on a panel of 20 OECD countries
2: 
it t i it
j
j
it j it G X U ε λ α χ β + + + + =∑  
αi and λt are country and time period fixed effects,
3  Uit is the standardised rate of 
unemployment, and Git is the OECD measure of the output gap. Finally, the X
j’s represent the 
policies and institutions considered among the explanatory variables. The variables included 
are:
 the tax-wedge between labour cost and take-home pay calculated on the basis of the 
OECD tax model for a single-earner couple with two children, at average earnings levels; a 
second measure of the tax wedge is based on national accounts and includes also consumption 
taxes; a summary measure of unemployment benefit generosity (an average of replacement 
rates across various earnings levels, family situations and durations of unemployment); the 
degree of stringency of EPL; the average degree of stringency of product market regulation 
(PMR) across seven non-manufacturing industries;
4 union membership rates; the degree of 
centralisation/co-ordination of wage bargaining.  
Using the observed changes in these policy/institutional variables in the recent past, the 
contribution of each of these variables to the change in unemployment can be calculated. The 
above equation is used to simulate the change in the unemployment rate between 1995 and 
2003 which in the Bassanini and Duval's paper is due to policy shocks. Policy shocks are 
identified with changes in each policy variable. Formally, the estimated coefficients (table 
                                                 
2   Bassanini, A and R. Duval (2006), "Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role of 
Policies and Institutions", OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers o. 35. Countries 
included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
3   The inclusion of country effects is necessary to control for country-specific averages of omitted policies and 
institutions. Since the policy and institutional indicators included in the analysis tend to be much more 
correlated across countries than within a given country and over time, one can expect that the inclusion of 
country effects is sufficient to control for most of the relevant omitted variables. The choice of fixed rather 
than random country effects reflects the view that country effects are unlikely to be independent from other 
explanatory variables included in the estimated equation – in which case random-effects FGLS estimators 
would yield inconsistent estimates.  
4   This PMR indicator is used here because it is available over the whole period 1975-2003 for most OECD 
countries, unlike the economy-wide indicator which covers only the period 1998-2003. One drawback is that 
changes in the PMR indicator for non-manufacturing industries do not incorporate all aspects of regulatory 
reforms that have been undertaken by a number of OECD countries in the past decades, such as 
administrative reforms affecting all sectors. As a result, the unemployment effects of regulatory reforms 
may not be fully captured by the econometric estimates.     10
1.2) are used to calculate the changes in the unemployment rate due to policy shocks and to 
the change in the output gap. 
  
) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ ˆ





i j i i G G X X U U − + − = − ∑ χ β  
where ^ denotes the estimated coefficients.  
The baseline equation contains 4 specifications (table 1.2). Specification 1 relates the 
unemployment rate to the OECD summary measure of the average replacement rate, the tax 
wedge, an index of product market regulation, a dummy variable for the degree of 
corporatism, the output gap, union density and EPL. Of these variables, the unemployment 
effects of both union density and EPL turn out to be statistically insignificant. Specification 2 
explores whether the impact of the replacement rate reflects the combined effect of the 
replacement rate during the first year of unemployment, the duration of benefit receipt and the 
interaction between these variables. In this case all variables turn out to have some effects on 
the unemployment rate. In particular, the estimate suggests a reduction in the benefit duration 
has a stronger effect on unemployment than a similar reduction in the replacement rate during 
the 1
st year of unemployment. Specification 3 splits the EPL into a component for regular and 
temporary workers; both turn out to be statistically significant (but not their interaction). 
However, only for the EPL for regular workers does tightening employment protection 
legislation imply a higher unemployment rate. 
5 
The tax wedge used in specification 1 is derived from OECD tax model and captures only 
labour taxes (social security contributions and income taxes), but not consumption taxes.
6 A 
broader measure of the tax wedge, which includes both labour and consumption taxes, has 
been derived from National Accounts data.
7 Re-estimating the equation using the National 
Accounts measure yields similar coefficients for all the explanatory variables, while no 
significant difference is found between the impact of labour and consumption taxes. 
Before presenting the results of these simulations a note of caution is needed. First, Bassanini 
and Duval (2006) estimate a static equation relating target variables to policy variables and 
the output gap. The static equation implicitly assumes that all effects of policy changes are 
exhausted in one year only. This implies that the effect of the policy variables might be biased 
upward. To a certain extent this choice is forced by the (almost) time unvarying nature of 
some labour market institutions. However, simulating the effects of policy shocks over a long 
period (1995-2003) may reduce this bias. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that policy-
induced changes in the unemployment rate reflect some policy shocks that occurred before 
1995.  
Second, the implicit assumption in the pooled estimate is that the effects of policy are the 
same for all OECD countries. This is not very convincing as it is equivalent to assuming that 
the deep parameters are the same across different countries and, implicitly, that labour market 
institutions do not explain cross countries differences in labour market performance.  
                                                 
5   For temporary workers the opposite occurs although the authors contend that this finding depends from the 
inclusion of Spain in the sample. 
6   The source is the OECD Taxing Wages Database, which defines it as the wedge between the labour cost to 
the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two 
children earning 100% of APW earnings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all 
social security contributions as a percentage of total labour cost. 
7   The National Accounts measure is more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems and provides a cruder 
picture of the tax incentives effectively faced by individuals than the tax model measure of the tax wedge. 
Hence, Tax model based measures of the tax wedge should be preferred.      11
Finally, in addition to policy and non-policy variables, the econometric specification includes 
global shocks captured by time varying fixed effects. Hence, the change in the observed 
unemployment rate equals the sum of the contribution of policy variables, of the output-gap of 
the global shocks and of a residual, which cannot be identified by the equation as the authors 
do not report the value of the time fixed effects. 
 
2.1.2 Results of econometric simulations 
 
The baseline specification is used to provide for each country the contribution to the change in 
the unemployment rate between 1995 and 2003 due to policy shocks and the output gap or to 
policy shocks only (see table 2A in the annex and graphs 1 and 2). Table 2A also reports the 
contributions of policy shocks to changes in the unemployment rate of the representative 
country (row un-weighted average) and of the EU aggregate (row weighted average)
8. Policy 
shocks are reported in graph 1.  
Between 1995 and 2003 the EU15 unemployment rate fell 2.7 percentage points. In the case 
of specifications 1 to 3, policy variables alone explain between 70% and 80% of the total 
decline in unemployment. In the case of specification 4, which measures the tax wedge on the 
basis of National Accounts data, policy variables explain less than 1/3 of the total decline in 
the unemployment rate (Graph 2).  
It turns out that the tax wedge measures used in the econometric specification are responsible 
for these different effects. Indeed, the fall in the unemployment rate due to a change in the tax 
wedge is higher when this wedge is measured on the basis of the OECD tax model for a single 
earner couple with two children earning 100% of the APW than when it is calculated from the 
National Accounts. This finding does not depend on the different estimated response of 
unemployment as the estimated coefficients do not differ too much (see table 1.2). It is rather 
the change in the two measures of the wedge that drives the results. An exploration of 
countries' policy shocks reveals large heterogeneity in the changes of the tax wedge. For 
example, some countries such as Ireland and the UK implemented specific policies (in work 
benefits for married couples and increased child allowances) aiming at reducing the tax 
burden for specific family types. In other countries, the reduction in the tax wedge was more 
generalised. Hence, the tax wedge indicator based on the single-earner couple with two 
children is too specific and doubts may arise about its use as the determinant of the overall 
unemployment rate. Ideally, one would calculate a weighted average of the tax wedge for 
different family types with weights being taken from the family structure of the working 
population.
9 We leave this for future work. The tax wedge based on national accounts 
(specification 4) is therefore the preferred measure. 
In terms of the contributions of single policy shocks, a reduction in the tax wedge and in the 
tightness of product market regulation accounts for a large decline in the unemployment rate. 
In the case of specification 2, a reform of the unemployment benefits system which increases 
the initial unemployment benefit replacement rate (for the EU un-weighted and weighted 
                                                 
8   EU refers to the EU Countries in the OECD database namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
9   In technical terms, the implicit assumption of poolability of the unemployment effects of a change in the tax 
wedge for a single earner couple with two children is not very convincing as it is equivalent to assume that 
countries have the same structure of the population and the same policies for different segment of this 
population.     12
average respectively by 3.3 and 5.9) and reduces its duration (for the EU un-weighted and 
weighted average respectively by about 1 month and less than one month) explains 10 per 
cent of the change in the unemployment rate due to policy shocks. 
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Average replacement rate (RR) 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09
[6.28]*** [6.79]*** [4.22]*** [4.16]*** [4.55]*** [3.93]***
Tax wedge 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.22
[9.75]*** [10.96]*** [11.14]*** [4.49]*** [8.22]*** [6.57]***
Union density -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.06
[1.57] [1.89]* [1.64] [0.56] [0.49] [1.69]* [2.51]**
EPL -0.31 -0.20 0.03 0.01 -0.60 -0.51
[0.98] [0.55] [0.08] [0.02] [1.45] [1.19]
PMR 0.60 0.67 0.73 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.79
[2.98]*** [3.29]*** [3.52]*** [2.17]** [2.17]** [2.24]** [3.32]***
High corporatism -1.42 -1.09 -1.39 -2.06 -2.09 -1.42 -1.58
[3.57]*** [2.88]*** [3.94]*** [4.80]*** [4.89]*** [3.56]*** [3.84]***
Output gap -0.48 -0.48 -0.47 -0.54 -0.54
[14.00]*** [14.21]*** [13.99]*** [11.89]*** [11.60]***










(EPL reg)*(EPL temp) -0.28
[1.21]
Labour tax rate 0.25
[4.82]***
Consumption tax rate 0.21
[1.92]*
Macroeconomic shocks:
TFP shock -13.01 -9.02
[3.55]*** [2.45]**
Terms of trade shock 19.44 19.13
[6.73]*** [6.55]***
Interest rate shock 0.22 0.19
[4.71]*** [3.98]***
Labour demand shock 11.84
[3.94]***
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 434 434 434 398 398 419 397
R-squared 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
OG = output gap. Absolute value of robust  t statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: Estimates by the OECD Secretariat on the basis of data sources described in Annex 2.
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ARR TWCOUP UNDENS EPL EPLR EPLT REGREF HIGHCORP RR1 UBENDUR1
stdev
 
Source: Own's calculation on Bassanini and Duval (2006) data; Standard deviation is calculated on annual 
changes in the policy indicators. Given the relatively short-time span, a change larger than one standard 
deviation is considered to be statistically significant 
Note: The variables are defined as follows: arr – Average unemployment benefit replacement rate (%); rr1 – 
Initial unemployment benefit replacement rate (%); ubendur1 – Unemployment benefit duration (years); twcoup 
– Tax wedge (%); epl – employment protection legislation; eplr – EPL regular contracts; eplt – EPL temporary 
contracts; pmr – product market regulation; undens – Union density (%); highcorp – High corporatism. 
 
Graph 2: Change in unemployment  
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Source: Own's calculation on Bassanini and Duval (2006) data. 
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2.2 The effects of labour and product market reforms – simulations 
using the QUEST II model 
 
This section describes QUEST II model simulations of policy induced changes in labour and 
product markets and describes the estimated contributions of these reforms to observed output 
growth and reductions in the unemployment rate. While improvements in data availability 
should allow refining of this exercise in the future, this first attempt already gives a positive 
message as regards the contribution of past reforms to growth and employment.  
 
The main results of this simulation exercise can be summarised as follows. For the labour and 
product market variables considered in this exercise (changes in tax wedge, average 
unemployment benefit replacement rate and price mark-ups), past changes over the period 
1995-2003 have on balance made a positive contribution to growth and employment in the 
EU15, contributing 1.2 percent to GDP and 0.56 percentage points to the reduction in the 
structural unemployment rate. The estimated contribution of all favourable changes alone, i.e. 
excluding any of detrimental changes in policy variables that have occurred, has been much 
larger. Reforms have raised GDP in the EU15 by 2 percent and reduced the structural 




This exercise uses the QUEST II model to analyse the role of observed changes in benefit 
replacement rates, taxation and product market changes on the rate of unemployment using 
the OECD indicators analysed in the preceding section for the same period 1995-2003. 
 
In the wage bargaining framework in the QUEST II model, the equilibrium unemployment 
rate depends on the 'reservation wage', which is a function of unemployment benefits 
(Pisarides, 1994). Changes in unemployment benefit replacement rates therefore have an 
effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate in the model. In case benefits are taxed 
differently to wages, the unemployment rate is also affected by tax changes. If benefits were 
fully tax exempt, an increase in wage taxes would reduce after-tax wage income relative to 
the reservation wage, lead to higher wage demands, and the tax increase would be mainly 
borne by firms and have a negative impact on employment. Product market reforms that lead 
to a more competitive environment lower the mark-up firms can charge over marginal costs. 
More competitive products markets lead to an expansion of activity levels and labour demand 
and reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment.     16
 
 
Box 2: The European Commission's QUEST II model 
This box provides an overview of main features of the QUEST II model and describes how it can be used to analyse the 
potential impact of structural reforms
10. The QUEST II model contains detailed structural models for each of the 25 EU 
member states, as well as the US and Japan, and smaller trade-feedback models for other countries and regions in the world. 
The model can be characterised as a New Keynesian Model, which combines the rigorous microfoundations of dynamic 
general equilibrium models with features of Keynesian style rigidities. The behavioural equations in the model are based on 
principles of dynamic optimisation of private households and firms. Economic agents are assumed to maximise utility and 
profit functions subject to intertemporal budget constraints and consumption and investment decisions therefore incorporate 
forward looking behaviour. The short run dynamic responses of the model also have a theoretical basis, like the presence of 
adjustment costs and overlapping contracts.  
 
The supply side of the economy is modelled explicitly via a neo-classical production function. This assures that the long run 
behaviour of the model resembles closely the standard neo-classical growth model and the model reaches a steady state 
growth path with a growth rate essentially determined by the rate of (exogenous) technical progress and the growth rate of the 
population. However, the model does take product and labour market imperfections into account. Firms are not perfectly 
competitive but can charge mark-ups over marginal cost in the long run. This mark-up affects prices, but also affects the 
demand for labour and investment. In general the size of mark-ups is inversely related to economic activity and the level of 
economic activity will be lower than that predicted from a model with perfect competition. Also, a bargaining framework is 
used to describe the interaction between firms and workers/trade unions, with wages set as a mark-up over the reservation 
wage, and involuntary unemployment persists even in the long run. Both types of mark-ups are suggested by economic 
theory as good quantitative indicators of the degree of product and labour market distortions. In the case of the labour market, 
in addition to the wage mark-up, the level of the reservation wage is itself related to structural policy measures such as 
minimum wages and social benefits. These features make the QUEST II model a suitable tool for analysing the effects of 
structural policies on growth and employment provided a link between policy measures and mark ups can be established 
empirically. The models can also be used to look a the effects of knowledge investment by using information on the marginal 
efficiency of different types of investment from empirical growth accounting studies and the effects of R&D investment by 
using estimates which link R&D investment to TFP.  
It should be noted that the QUEST II model allows for a comprehensive analysis of structural reforms by not only looking at 
(long run) supply side effects but also taking (short run) demand effects into account. The short run behaviour of the model is 
influenced by standard Keynesian features since the model allows for imperfectly flexible wages and prices, liquidity 
constrained consumption, adjustment costs for investment and labour hoarding. These features distinguish QUEST II from 
other general equilibrium models and permit an assessment of potential adverse demand effects in the short run during the 
adjustment process to structural reforms.  
Finally, QUEST II contains a detailed description of the public finances and includes various tax variables, like wage, profit 
and value-added taxes. It therefore allows to take into account the budgetary implications of structural reforms. 
 
Structural policies can either be directly or indirectly evaluated depending on how the respective policy measures are 
represented in the model. The effects of all those policy instruments which are used as exogenous variables in the model can 
be analysed directly by simulating permanent changes of the respective policy instrument. This holds, for example, for tax 
rates, social security contributions and social benefits. There are other policy measures which do not directly affect 
endogenous variables but have an indirect effect on the economy by changing the degree of competition in goods and labour 
markets or boosting technological progress. In other words these policy measures have an effect on the size of mark-ups or 
TFP. Examples of such measures are anti-trust regulation, measures to reduce entry barriers in the case of goods markets, 
changes in hiring and firing rules in the case of labour markets or investments in R&D. The macroeconomic effects of these 
measures can be evaluated in a two step procedure. First an empirical link between such policy measures and mark ups must 
be established. In a second step the QUEST II model can be used to analyse the effect of the respective mark-up reduction on 
the macroeconomic variables of interest.  
 
QUEST II has been used previously to analyse the effects of structural reforms. Recent examples are an analysis for DG 
MARKT on the macroeconomic effects of the Single market program after 10 years and an analysis of the macroeconomic 
effects of structural reforms in labour and product markets in the 90s on macroeconomic performance, published in the EU 
Economy Review 2002 and an analysis of the effects of a tax shift from direct to indirect taxation for DG TAXUD. The 






                                                 
10   For a more detailed description of the model, see Roeger and in 't Veld (1997, 2002)     17
 
2.2.2 Changes in labour market institutions 
 
Table 2 describes changes in the OECD indicators on labour market institutions between 1995 
and 2003. The unemployment benefit replacement rate 
11 has on average increased in the EU. 
There are some large outliers (large increases in Ireland and Italy, large reduction in 
Denmark) but in both Germany and France the average benefit replacement rate has increased 
by 1 and 2 percentage points respectively. At an aggregate macroeconomic level it appears 
therefore that there have been increases in benefit generosity in some countries. However, this 
measure may not fully reflect significant changes in benefit replacement rates for low 
earnings and low skilled groups, which have in many countries become less generous and 
raised employment levels for these groups. As the current version of the model does not 
distinguish between different skill groups, the effects of reduced benefit generosity for the 
lower skilled cannot be captured in this exercise. In the simulation, the average replacement 
rate is used and in countries where this has increased, the model will predict a negative impact 
on employment levels. The tax wedge measure applied here is derived from National 
Accounts and covers both labour and consumption taxes
12. On aggregate there has been a 
reduction in the tax wedge in the EU, a small increase in labour taxes more than compensated 
for by a reduction in consumption taxes.  
 
Table 2 : Changes in labour market variables  
 
Average 
replacement rate  Tax wedge (NA)  Labour tax rates 
(NA) 
Cons. tax rates 
(NA) 
Austria   -1.0  1.7  1.2  0.6 
Belgium   3.4  0.2  0.9  -0.6 
Germany 0.9  -1.6  -1.0  -0.6 
Denmark -15.4  3.1  1.4  1.8 
Spain   -4.7  2.0  0.6  1.4 
Finland -0.2  -1.8  -2.2  0.3 
France 2.0  -1.2  -0.1  -1.1 
UK  -1.4 0.0 1.6 -1.6 
Ireland   11.8  -6.8  1.3  -8.2 
Italy 14.4  0.4  2.2  -1.8 
Netherlands    0.0 -4.5 -5.7 1.2 
Portugal 5.4  0.0  0.6  -0.6 
Sweden  -2.4 0.2 1.1 -1.0 
EU  unweighted  average  1.0 -0.6 0.1 -0.8 
EU  weighted  average 1.8 -0.5 0.2 -0.7 




                                                 
11   The average unemployment benefit replacement rate is measured across two income situations (100% and 
67% of APW earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and 
three different unemployment durations (1
st year, 2
nd and 3
rd years, and 4
th and 5
th years of unemployment). 
12   Although tax measures derived from National Accounts can suffer from endogeneity problems, this should 
be less of a problem when we take differences between 1995 and 2003. The measure derived from National 
Accounts is wider than the alternative measure in the OECD database, the labour tax wedge for a single-
earner couple, with two children at average earnings levels, which is derived from OECD tax models and 
captures labour taxes (income taxes and social security contributions) but not consumption taxes.     18
2.2.3 Changes in product markets 
 
More competition in product markets can also impact on labour market performance. 
Increased entry by new firms raises output and labour demand. A more competitive product 
market, in which firms extract lower rents, could also strengthen the bargaining position of 
employers, reducing wage demands and so increasing employment. To capture the 
employment effects of product market regulations, Bassanini and Duval (2006) include the 
OECD PMR indicator in their regression. This indicator measures regulatory impediments to 
product market competition in seven non-manufacturing industries (energy and service 
industries).  In the QUEST model the variable that best captures product market competition 
is the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. Griffith and Harrison (2004) perform a panel 
data econometric analysis of the role of several product market reform indicators on the mark-
up, using Fraser Institute indicators (which are a wider measure than the OECD PMR 
indicator and apply to the business sector, rather than only network industries) over the period 
1985-2000. They find mark-ups are lower when entry is easier and the average tariff is lower, 
but higher when there are less price controls. Applying their regression results to changes in 
these indicators between 1995 and 2003, changes in the mark-ups can be calculated (Table 3). 
Griffith and Harrison find over their estimation period a strong effect from lower tariffs, but 
applying their coefficient to our data period yields unrealistically large reductions in the mark-
ups. This is possibly due to differences in variation over the respective sample periods, but an 
update of the panel data econometric analysis would be required to shed further light on this. 
We have chosen to focus instead on the effects of the ease of starting a new business and price 
controls only. According to these calculations, average mark-ups in the EU15 have declined 
by 1.3 percentage points 
13.  Mark-ups have fallen most in Sweden, the UK and Austria, 
France and Germany.  Further analysis should show whether the reductions in mark-ups in 
Table 2 are consistent with those that can be estimated from more detailed sectoral price and 
productivity data using the forthcoming EUKLEMS database, but for the moment data 
availability prevents us from estimating mark-ups directly. 
                                                 
13   The calculated mark-ups have also been rescaled to correct for differences in the mean value of the mark-
ups, which are higher in the Griffith&Harrison study than in the QUEST model baseline.     19
 
 
Table 3 : Changes in Fraser Institute indicators of product market reform and estimated 
changes in mark-ups 
 
Change in Fraser Institute Indicators  
1995-2003 








5Ci  Price 
controls 
 
4Aii  Mean 
tariff rate  
 
Starting a new 
business +  Price 
controls 
 
Starting a new 
business + Price 
controls + Mean 
tariff rate 
Austria  1.8 0.0 1.1 -0.022 -0.050 
Belgium -0.1  0.0  0.7  0.001  -0.018 
Denmark -0.2  -2.0  1.1  -0.014  -0.042 
Finland -0.9  -1.0  1.1  0.002  -0.026 
France  1.1 -1.0 1.1  -0.021  -0.049 
Germany  0.2 -2.0 1.1  -0.019  -0.047 
Greece -0.5  -2.0  1.1  -0.010  -0.041 
Ireland -1.6  -4.0  1.1  -0.013  -0.033 
Italy -0.3  -1.0  1.1  -0.005  -0.020 
Netherlands -1.4  -1.0  1.1  0.008  -0.028 
Portugal  0.0 0.0 1.1  0.000  -0.022 
Spain -1.2  -1.0  1.1  0.006  -0.063 
Sweden  2.3 -1.0 1.1  -0.035  -0.056 
United Kingdom  -0.4  -4.0  1.1  -0.027  -0.050 
EU15 (average)  -0.03  -1.70  1.05  -0.013  -0.041 
Source: Gwartney&Lawson (2006). and estimates based on Griffith&Harrison (2004), , Table 9 
 
2.2.4 Simulation results 
 
What has been the long run effect of these changes in labour and product market variables on 
output and unemployment in the EU member states? To answer this question each of the 
changes identified above has been simulated with the QUEST model. There have, of course, 
been other important policy measures which have contributed to growth and employment, but 
the simulations can only show the contributions of the changes in the policy variables that are 
considered here. Table 4 below shows the resulting long run changes in GDP and 
unemployment for each scenario separately and when all are combined
14. In all cases, the 
simulations include spillovers from reforms in other EU member states which further enhance 
growth effects.  
 
On an aggregate macroeconomic level, the unemployment benefit replacement rate has 
increased on average in the EU, and this leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.3 
percentage points for the EU15. As mentioned above, this measure may not fully reflect 
substantial differences in benefit generosity for different skill levels and hence not properly 
capture reforms that have taken place. As measured by the average replacement rate, benefits 
have become more generous in Italy and Ireland especially and this has had the strongest 
detrimental impact on the unemployment rate in these countries. In Denmark on the other 
hand, the replacement rate has fallen substantially and this has had a positive effect on 
employment and activity levels.  
                                                 
14   Note that there was no data on labour market variables for Greece and hence the results shown are pure 
spillovers.     20
 
As indicated by the tax wedge data derived from National Accounts, most EU member states 
have seen a reduction in taxes over the period 1995-2003. According to the model, this has 
led to a decline in the unemployment rate of 0.2 percentage points for the EU15. For some 
countries, these tax indicators point to a negative impact on employment (Denmark, Italy, 
Austria, Spain, Sweden, UK, Belgium). The effect of product market reforms, as captured by 
the derived reductions in mark-ups, has been generally positive and led to a fall in the 
unemployment rate by 0.7 percentage points. On average for the EU15, all scenarios 
combined yield a reduction in the structural unemployment rate of almost 0.6 percentage 
points, but for the euro area only 0.3 percentage points. The estimated impact of policy 
changes on output has been 1.2 percent, somewhat smaller for the euro area (0.8 percent). For 
comparison, the estimated fall in the NAIRU over this period for the EU15 was 0.8 
percentage points, while output grew by almost 20 percent (Table 5). 
 
As is clear from the tables, not all changes in labour market and product market policies have 
been favourable. In some member states tax rates and replacement rates have increased and this 
has a negative impact on employment in the model. Therefore it is interesting to see what the 
estimated effect of only the favourable changes has been. For that purpose the final column in 
Table 4 shows the results of a separate simulation in which all unfavourable changes that went 
'in the wrong direction' have been excluded, and this could be interpreted as representing the 
effects of 'true reforms'. This can be compared to the net effects of all changes in policy 
variables and the difference can be attributed to 'unfavourable' changes in policies which have 
partly (or completely) counteracted the positive effects of reforms. 
 
Including only the favourable changes for each of the member states yields much larger 
positive effects (see final column Table 4), with the largest gains for Denmark, Ireland and the 
UK. For the EU15 on average, reforms are estimated to have contributed 2 per cent to output 
and 1.4 percentage points to the reduction in the structural rate of unemployment. For the euro 
area the estimated contributions are only slightly smaller, 1.7 percent higher GDP and 1.1 pp. 
lower NAIRU. Comparing this to the 'net' effects of all policy changes in the previous column 
shows the extent to which unfavourable policy changes have offset the gains from reforms.  
 
For individual countries, the results mainly reflect the changes in labour and product market set 
out in Tables 3 and 4., For Germany, interestingly, the contribution of these policy changes on 
unemployment and growth are estimated to have been significant (with reductions in the 
structural unemployment rate of -1.6 and -1.9 respectively). The estimated effects for Italy and 
Portugal are the most disappointing.  
 
One can conclude from this exercise that the reforms included here have made a substantial 
contribution to growth and employment. Further analysis should show whether these findings 
are robust for other indicators of reforms. The focus here has been on only a limited number of 
indicators and many other policy reform measures are likely to have contributed to the 
improvements in labour market performance. Further work is required to improve data inputs 
and to capture a wider range of reforms. 
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Table 4:  Simulated long run effects of changes in labour and product markets 1995-2003  on 




















GDP U GDP U GDP U GDP U GDP U  GDP U  GDP U 
BE 
 
-0.52 0.60 -0.07 0.21 -0.21   0.37   0.14  -0.15   0.37  -0.20  -0.23  0.62  0.81   -0.53 
DK 
 
1.93 -2.75 -0.95 1.34 -0.62   0.86  -0.32   0.47   1.63  -0.95  2.61  -2.34  4.00   -3.91 
DE 
 
-0.29 0.25 0.55 -0.75 0.39 -0.57   0.16 -0.18  1.75  -1.13  2.00  -1.62  2.46   -1.94 
GR 
 
-0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.00   0.01 -0.01  0.10   0.03  0.06  0.03  0.63   -0.15 
ES 
 
0.25 -0.57 -0.21 0.31 -0.07   0.14  -0.14   0.17  -0.03   0.11  0.01  -0.16  0.82   -0.62 
FR 
 
-0.38 0.38 0.27 -0.30 0.06 -0.05   0.22 -0.25  1.72  -0.72  1.61  -0.64  2.10   -1.05 
IE 
 
-2.39 3.07 1.07 -1.13 -0.35   0.48   1.42  -1.61   1.31  -0.54  -0.11  1.53  2.91   -2.22 
IT 
 
-1.53 1.91 -0.21 0.37 -0.46   0.64   0.25  -0.27   0.45  -0.09  -1.32  2.22  0.80   -0.37 
NL 
 
-0.11 0.04 1.19 -1.62 1.31 -1.81 -0.13   0.19 -0.31   0.17  0.77  -1.41  1.70   -2.01 
AT 
 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.21 0.35 -0.18   0.29  -0.02   0.06   1.29  -0.47  1.05  -0.20  1.48   -0.60 
PT 
 
-0.38 0.47 0.00 0.03 -0.05   0.08   0.05  -0.05   0.08  -0.00  -0.31  0.50  0.16   -0.06 
SF 
 
-0.16 0.01 0.73 -0.95 0.71  -1.00   0.01   0.04   0.51  -0.16  1.07  -1.10  1.69   -1.35 
SW 
 
0.25 -0.28 -0.22 0.27 -0.41   0.47   0.19  -0.21   3.55  -1.38  3.58  -1.40  4.11   -1.94 
UK 
 
0.21 -0.26 0.20 0.22 -0.49   0.60   0.29  -0.37   2.71  -1.45  2.72  -1.49  3.25   -2.12 
EU12
 
-0.52 0.52 0.25 -0.29 0.10 -0.14   0.15 -0.15  1.04  -0.52  0.76  -0.28  1.68   -1.14 
EU15
 
-0.34 0.30 0.14 -0.16 -0.02   0.02   0.17  -0.18   1.38  -0.71  1.18  -0.56  2.04   -1.38 
 
Table 5: Contributions to growth and unemployment  
 
  Simulated contribution of all 
observed policy changes 
Simulated contribution of 
favourable policy changes  
 
1995-2003 
Cumulative GDP growth : 
EU12 
  
0.76 1.68  18.48 
EU15 
  
1.18 2.04  19.66 
 
Change in NAIRU: 
EU12   -0.28  -1.14  -0.75 
( 9.22 - 8.47) 
EU15 -0.56  -1.38  -0.78 
(8.71 - 7.93) 
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3. Pension reform: the effect of increasing the effective 
retirement age – a simulation using ECFIN's Ageing model 
 
In this retirement simulation, the effective retirement age, presently close to 60 in the EU, is 
gradually brought back up to the average statutory retirement age of 65 over the next 10 
years.
15 Part of the rationale for this simulation is the fact that since the 1960s there has been 
an enormous deterioration in the so-called “passivity” ratio which measures the number of 
years worked relative to the number of years spent in retirement. In the 1960s, the passivity 
ratio was about 3
16 but this ratio has recently fallen to less than 2 due to increases in life 
expectancy and falls in the effective retirement age to less than 60.  
3.1 Methodology 
 
The model used for the analysis in this paper is a conventional neoclassical, overlapping 
generations, model. It is a variant of the QUEST II model. Households are divided into two 
groups, namely working age and pensioners. Since there is no bequest motive in the model, 
this implies that pensioners have a lower propensity to save than working age households (in 
fact, consistent with the life cycle hypothesis, pensioners dissave in order to end up with zero 
assets at the end of their life). Production is characterised by a neoclassical production 
function with constant returns to scale (for more details on the model refer to Roeger and Mc 
Morrow (2003). 
3.2 Simulation results 
 
From the graphs given to summarise the effects of this retirement simulation (i.e. graphs 3a-
3d), it is clear that an increase in the effective retirement age (ERA) to the statutory age has 
major benefits in terms of growth and budgetary sustainability, as well as being relatively 
favourable with regard to income distribution.  
In terms of budgetary developments, the impact is quite dramatic. As a rough rule of thumb 
the public expenditure impact of an increase in the ERA is of the order of 1 to 1 (i.e. if 
workers were to work, on average, one additional year before retiring, the increase in public 
expenditure on pensions over the period to 2050 would be reduced by 0.84 of a percentage 
point of GDP). This strong budgetary gain is however predicated on the assumption that any 
additional years in employment do not yield any additional pension benefits.
17  
In addition to the very favourable public finance impact, the increase in the average working 
life also appears to simultaneously meet other key policy objectives such as boosting growth 
                                                 
15    For this simulation ECFIN ageing model was used which is a variant of the QUEST II model with 
overlapping generations specification. 
16   In other words workers spent 3 years in employment for every year spent in retirement. 
17    This assumption is crucial since in a separate simulation based on an "actuarially fair" adjustment of 
pensions to reflect the increased number of contribution years, the budgetary gain from an additional year of 
work falls from 0.84 of a percentage point of GDP to 0.6, while the GDP gain stays roughly the same as in 
the main simulation. The definition of "actuarially fair" used in this simulation is based on the assumption 
that in return for the extra five years of contributions that the generosity of one's annual pension would 
increase by slightly less than 12 per cent relative to what it would otherwise have been but pensioners will 
receive this higher pension for, on average, five years less than in the baseline scenario. Consequently, while 
the fiscal gain is reduced it still remains relatively substantial.     23
and avoiding big changes in income distribution, which in the longer term could call into 
question the political sustainability of any pension reforms that have been set in place.  
In terms of GDP, the increase in the retirement age has a significant effect on the level of 
GDP, with the latter growing by over 13 per cent compared with the baseline, thereby on its 
own going a long way towards offsetting the GDP loss associated with ageing.
18  
Finally, as shown in Graph 3d, this parametric reform is also relatively good from an income 
distribution perspective, with the consumption of both the working age population and 
pensioners rising relative to the baseline. 
 
Table 6: Increase in Effective Retirement Age from  60 to 65 
Growth  Budgetary Impact  Income Distribution   
 








(% of Wages) 
Public Pension 
Expenditure 










(% Diff. from 
Baseline) 
2005  0  16.1 10.5  0  0 
2030  +8.7 18.3  12.0 +5.2  +13.8 
2050  +13.1 20.5  13.4 +10.8  +16.3* 
* Given that pensioners do not receive any additional pension entitlements from working the five extra years, 
assumed in the simulation, this higher level of consumption relative to that of the working age population simply 
reflects the fact that life cycle consumers will have a shorter period over which to consume their accumulated 
lifetime wealth. 
 
Graph 3 : Increase in the Effective Retirement Age to  65 
A : Passivity Ratio*







Average Passivity Ratio in 1960's
Retirement Simulation 
Baseline Scenario








B : Public Pension Expenditure
(% of GDP)
*Number of Years Spent Working V Spent in Retirement
 
                                                 
18   Note that the Annual Progress Report refers to a one-year increase in the effective retirement age. Using an 
approximate linearity of the model simulations, these figures are scaled-down results reported in the Table 6.     24
C : GDP Effect of Increasing the Effective 
Retirement Age
(Relative to the Baseline Scenario)






















D : Retirement Scenario - Consumption 
(Relative to Baseline Scenario)
 
 
4. The Internal Market in an enlarged EU - the effects of 
simulations using the QUEST II model 
 
This section presents simulations of the macroeconomic impact of the Internal Market 
Programme, particularly taking into account the more recent progress made in terms of 
liberalisation of network industries and the accession of 10 new Member States.  
The Commission’s QUEST II model has been used to carry out simulations ex-post of the 
macroeconomic impact of the Internal Market over the period 1992-2006. The simulations for 
the manufacturing industry are based on parameter estimates found in the empirical literature 
on the impact of the Internal Market on price-cost mark-ups and total factor productivity
19. 
For network industries, the reduction in aggregate price-cost mark-ups associated with the 
liberalisation of network industries (electricity and telecommunication) is assumed to be 
0.5%. This parameter estimate is based on preliminary evidence for the electricity sector 
suggesting a decline in price-cost margins of up to 25%
20. A somewhat larger decline in price-
cost margins in telecommunications is assumed in light of the faster pace of liberalisation in 
that sector
21. The 0.5% aggregate mark-up shock reflects these sectoral declines in price-cost 
margins plus the weight of the electricity and telecommunication sectors in GDP. The 
introduction of this shock in QUEST II results in an increase in GDP and employment of 
0.4% and 0.6% respectively after 4 years; GDP is estimated to increase by 0.6% after 10 
years
22. 
                                                 
19   See: Allen et al. (1998), Buigues et al. (1990), Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Notaro (2002) and Salgado 
(2002). 
20   See: Roeger and Warzynski (2002). 
21   The (cautious) assumption has been made that mark-ups in the telecommunications sector have decreased by 
50% more than in electricity. This assumption is also consistent with the more advanced state of 
liberalisation in telecommunications.  
These effects are somewhat stronger than the Internal Market effects, because in these simulations it is   
assumed that deregulation also has an effect on rent sharing between workers and firms. The decline in     25
These intra-EU15 simulations have been combined with simulations capturing the effects of 
EU enlargement. The enlargement simulations consist of three steps: (1) isolating the trade 
effect of the enlargement; (2) computing the resulting effect on mark-ups and total factor 
productivity; and finally (3) introducing the estimated mark-up and total factor productivity 
shocks into the QUEST model. According to the simulations, the magnitude of the 
enlargement effects varied substantially between the old and new Member States as the latter 
faced much higher mark-up and total factor productivity shocks during the early years of the 
enlargement. For the EU15 the simulations showed a 0.27% GDP increase in 2006
23 (relative 
to the baseline level) as a result of enlargement. This was accompanied by a slight increase in 
employment. (see table 7 and 8). In contrast the simulations for the new Member States 
showed a GDP increase of 2.9% on average, while employment increased by 0.5% in 2006 
(relative to the baseline). 
To compute the combined effect of EU15 integration and the enlargement, the corresponding 
yearly mark-up and total factor productivity shocks have been added up. Table 9 presents the 
results for the EU25. These results show that the enlarged Internal Market (including 
liberalisation of network industries) is an important source of growth and jobs. As a result of 
the progress made over the period 1992-2006 in achieving an enlarged Internal Market of 25 
Member States, GDP and employment levels have increased significantly. The estimated 
"gains" from the Internal Market in 2006 amount to 2.2% of EU GDP (or 223 billion euro) 
and 1.4% of total employment (or 2.75 million jobs). These gains could have been 
substantially larger if services market had been fully opened up to cross-border competition. 
 
Table 7: GDP effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the liberalisation of network industries 
and enlargement (deviation from baseline level), 2002-2006 
EU15  EU10 
Network+SMP
a  Enlargement Network+SMP+Enlargement  Enlargement
b  Years 
mrd EUR  %  mrd EUR  %
  mrd EUR  %  mrd EUR  % 
2002  164,5 1,79%  15,9  0,17%  180,4  1,96%  8,8  1,96% 
2003  168,4  1,81%  18,9 0,20%  187,3  2,01% 11,4 2,45% 
2004  172,2  1,81%  21,2 0,22%  193,4  2,03% 12,8 2,62% 
2005  176,1  1,83%  24,5 0,25%  200,6  2,08% 14,8 2,90% 
2006  179,9  1,83%  27,1 0,27%  207,0  2,10% 15,6 2,91% 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
price-cost mark-ups is therefore associated with a decline in the mark-up of wages over the reservation 
wage. 
23   The enlargement trade effect is identifiable already in the years before enlargement took place in 2004.     26
Table 8: Employment effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the liberalisation of network 
industries and enlargement (deviation from baseline level), 2002-2006 
EU15  EU10 
Network+SMP
a  Enlargement Network+SMP+Enlargement  Enlargement
b  Years 
1000 p.  %  1000 p.  %  1000 p.  %  1000 p.  % 
2002  2450,6 1,47%  67,9  0,04%  2518,5  1,51%  118,9  0,41% 
2003  2454,5 1,46%  85,4  0,05%  2539,9  1,51%  104,2  0,36% 
2004  2458,3 1,45%  86,0  0,05%  2544,3  1,50%  116,5  0,40% 
2005  2462,2 1,44%  104,1  0,06%  2566,3  1,50%  145,0  0,49% 
2006  2466,0 1,43%  122,4  0,07%  2588,4  1,50%  162,1  0,54% 
 
Table 9: Total GDP and employment effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the liberalisation 
of network industries and enlargement (deviation from baseline level), 2002-2006 
EU25 
Total GDP effect  Total employment effect  Years 
mrd EUR  %  1000 p.  % 
2002  189,2 1,96% 2637,4  1,35% 
2003  198,7 2,05% 2644,1  1,34% 
2004  206,2 2,08% 2660,8  1,34% 
2005  215,4 2,15% 2711,2  1,35% 
2006  222,6 2,18% 2750,5  1,36% 
Sources:  * EU15 Internal Market and network liberalization effect: W. Röger and K. Sekkat (2002), 'Request 
from DG MARKT to Assess the Macroeconomic Effects of the Single Market Program after 10 years.' 
** Effect of enlargement on EU15 and EU10: J. Varga (2006): 'Ex-post Simulation of the Early Enlargement 
Process with QUEST II.' The impact of enlargement is based on manufacturing data only, see p. 8. "Table 1: Ex-
post enlargement effects (deviation from baseline-level), EU12-EU15" 
GDP: AMECO, Gross domestic product at current market prices in mrd EUR in 2002 prices 
EMPLOYMENT: Employment, 1000 persons; total economy (National accounts) 
Note: The EU15 network + SMP effect (column A) is calculated by linear interpolation from the results of 
Roeger and Sekkat (2002). 
 
5. Reductions in administrative burden 
 
Reducing the costs European companies encounter due to compliance with administrative 
regulation laid out in national and European legislation is one of the five most important 
Lisbon goals. Estimates provided by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB) suggest that in EU administrative costs imposed on European companies are 
in the magnitude of 3.5% of GDP.  
 
This section analyses the effects of reducing these costs by 25% over the period 2006 to 2010 
in EU. It presents results of two sets of simulations: one produced with the QUEST model and 
the second with the WorldScan model. Both simulations are designed in a similar way:     27
starting from an impact effect of 0.8% of GDP which is equivalent to the 25% reduction in 
administrative burden. Nevertheless, the channels through which the effects materialise are 
different. In the QUEST simulation, we regard a reduction of administrative burden as a 
reduction of fixed costs. In other words, the reduction of fixed costs implies that the 
productivity of an individual production worker is not increased by a reduction of 
administrative cost, only average productivity of all employees is increased because the firm 
can produce the same level of output with a smaller number of employees working in the 
administrative departments of the company. On the other hand, the WorldScan simulation 
assumes that reduction in administrative burden leads to an increase in the efficiency of 
labour, i.e. the shock is given through labour augmenting technical progress. 
 
Unfortunately not many quantitative estimates on the size of the administrative burden exist. 
In order to arrive at an estimate in the case of Europe, Kox (2005) combines two sources, 
namely an international comparative study conducted by World Bank economists (Djankov et 
al. (2002)) which compiles information on firm start-up costs for 85 countries, with an 
aggregate measure of administrative costs carried out for the Netherlands which not only 
takes into account administrative costs arising from starting a new company but also contains 
information about administrative costs of existing firms.  
 
The Djankov study tracks all officially required administrative procedures and costs which are 
normally required for setting up a firm, such as taxes, screening costs, safety & health, 
environmental and labour related requirements. The study uses official information as well as 
information by country experts. Djankov et al. count the number of mandatory procedures in 
the above mentioned areas and estimate the time it takes for completing each procedure in 
order to arrive at a cost measure. As an alternative source Kox also uses an OECD study 
which also focuses on the cost/time it takes to register a public limited company. Both the 
OECD and the Djankov study arrive at similar results concerning the time it takes to comply 
with the administrative procedures. In both studies, the countries with the lowest 
administrative start up costs are the UK, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, while the countries 
with the largest start up costs are Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. 
 
The aggregate measure for the Netherlands is based on a study carried out by the Dutch 
government for the year 2002 where the administrative costs implied by government 
regulations and information requirements are estimated based on interviews in which 
companies where asked to provide information about the annual costs of such regulations
24.  
 
In order to obtain aggregate measures for all EU member states Kox merges the aggregate 
information for the Netherlands with the cross section information on start up costs to 
estimate aggregate costs for all EU member states. Obviously these are rough estimates since 
they assume that the distribution of start up costs is representative for the administrative 
burden in general. According to these estimates, the total administrative burden in EU is about 
3.4% of GDP and it varies across countries with Greece and Hungary showing the highest 
estimate of 6.8% and the UK, Sweden and Finland the lowest estimate of 1.5% of GDP. 
  
                                                 
24   In autumn 2004, the EU finance ministers have agreed on a similar methodology for assessing the costs of 
administrative burdens in their respective countries either on more general or more narrowly defined policy 
areas. See, Informal ECOFIN bulletin, 10 and 11 September 2004 and 'The Administrative Burden 
Declaration' from June 2004.      28
5.1 QUEST III simulation results 
 
The results of the simulation exercise with the QUEST III model can be summarised briefly 
as follows.
25 We start from the observation that the administrative burden acts like a fixed 
cost for firms. Therefore a reduction of the administrative burden has a direct cost reducing 
effect but it also reduces entry barriers and may therefore have a competition enhancing 
effect, depending on the degree of competition in the goods market. Two scenarios are 
analysed. In scenario 1 we only consider a cost reduction of 25% (or 0.85% of GDP), while 
scenario 2 combines the cost reduction with a competition effect. Scenario 1 yields a long run 
GDP level effect of about 1% (0.9% in 2025). If the reduction of administrative burdens leads 
to new entry as assumed in scenario 2, an output effect of up to a maximum of 2% (1.8% in 
2025) is feasible.   
 
Important additional information supplied by the Dutch study is that the administrative costs 
are to a large extent size-independent of overhead costs. This fixed cost nature of the 
administrative burden will be taken into account in the simulation exercise. In the QUEST III 
model, production is subject to fixed and variable cost.  
 
In the simulation exercise it is assumed that firms require less overhead labour if the 
administrative burden is reduced (for a more technical description, see the appendix to this 
note). While the reduction of fixed costs is an immediate consequence of a reduction in 
administrative burden, there is one possible additional implication. The fixed costs associated 
with regulation can be regarded as an entry barrier. They define a lower bound for mark ups 
firms must charge in order to cover these fixed costs. With well functioning product markets 
it can be expected that a reduction in fixed costs will lead to more entry and an erosion of 
mark ups to re establish the pre reform level of economic rents. In the following we therefore 
present two scenarios. In the first scenario we only consider the macroeconomic effects of a 
reduction in the regulatory burden under the assumption that no entry takes place 
(administrative cost reduction with imperfect goods markets). In a second scenario we allow 
for entry. In fact we consider a maximum possible competition effect by allowing entry and 
an associated decrease in mark ups to a point where all additional profits from a reduction in 
administrative costs would be eroded. (administrative cost reduction with free entry). In the 
simulations reported below it is assumed that the administrative burden in EU15 which 
currently amounts to 3.4% of GDP is reduced by 25% (or .85% of GDP) over the period 2006 
to 2010.  
 
5.1.1 Scenario  1:  Reducing  administrative costs only  
 
A reduction in administrative costs is beneficial for firms since it reduces average production 
costs, i. e. less overhead labour is required for producing the same level of output. However, 
unlike an increase in labour augmenting technical progress, a reduction of fixed costs does not 
increase the marginal product of labour and therefore it leads to a downward shift in labour 
demand
26. It increases profitability of firms and therefore increases investment, however, as 
                                                 
25   This exercise is carried out for the EU15 aggregate. For the simulation, a new variant of the QUEST III 
model (based on the estimated DSGE model described in Ratto et al. (2006))  is used which incorporates 
improvements on the production side. In particular a clear distinction is made between variable costs and 
fixed costs (especially in the form of overhead labour). For more detail, see Annex B. 
26   See Appendix B.     29
shown in Table 10 below the increase in investment is not strong enough to prevent 
employment from falling below the baseline level.  
 
Table 10: Reducing administrative costs 
  Without free entry  With free entry 
 Y C I K  WR  L Y C I K  WR  L 
2006  0.2 0.1 -0.0  -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 
2007  0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.1 
2010  0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.0  -0.1  -0.4 1.3 0.7 2.1 0.3 1.2 0.1 
2015  0.9 0.8 0.4 0.1 -0.2  -0.4 1.6 1.1 2.4 1.0 1.5 0.1 
2025  0.9 0.9 0.5 0.3 -0.2  -0.4 1.8 1.2 2.5 1.7 1.7 0.1 
2055  1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 -0.1  -0.4 2.0 1.4 2.7 2.5 1.9 0.1 
Source QUEST III model 
The results reported in the table are per cent deviations from baseline levels. 
Y: GDP; C: private consumption; I: investment; K: capital; WR: real wage rate; 
L: employment  
 
The results show, a reduction in administrative burden is beneficial in terms of output, 
investment and consumption but it has negative employment effects. Because of negative 
employment effects the overall macroeconomic impact of the reform does hardly exceed the 
direct effect. Also notice, in this scenario a reduction in administrative costs has distributional 
consequences, the wage share declines by about 1% point, while the rate of pure profits 
(revenue minus labour and capital costs as a percent of the capital stock (at replacement 
value)) increases by .4% points. 
 
5.1.2 Scenario  2:  Reducing administrative costs and allowing free entry 
 
If goods markets are sufficiently flexible such that a reduction of fixed costs induces the entry 
of new firms, then there is more room for employment creation. In this scenario it is assumed 
that entry leads to a reduction in mark ups until the pre-reform rate of pure profits is re-
established.
27 This must be seen as the maximum possible competition effect that can be 
achieved by this reform. As can be seen in Table 10, taking into account competition effects, 
can significantly increases the output response associated with a reduction in the 
administrative cost. In particular increased competition and new entry prevents a decline of 
employment and leads to an increase in real wages. While in the first scenario the benefits of 
reducing the administrative burden accrue to capital owners, with free entry benefits accrue to 
workers.  
 
5.2 WorldScan simulation results 
 
We estimate the effects of a gradual reduction up to 2010 of 25% in the costs European 
companies encounter due to compliance with administrative regulation laid out in national 
and European legislation using the WorldScan
28 model (Lejour et al., 2006). This exercise 
follows Gelauff and Lejour (2006).  
                                                 
27   In the model this implies a reduction of the mark up of 1.2 % points.  
28   WorldScan is a global (recursive) dynamic computable general equilibrium model with multiple regions, 
sectors, and production factors as well as imperfect competition that focuses on the economies of the     30
5.2.1 Methodology 
 
The implementation of the scenarios varies from the earlier simulations in Gelauff and Lejour 
(2006) in as such that (i) we apply the country distribution of administrative cost (see first 
data column of Table 11) to the entire 25% cost reduction and not only to the part that 
corresponds to the national legislation (estimated at 58% for The Netherlands), while the part 
that corresponds to the European legislation (estimated at 42% for The Netherlands) is 
associated with the Dutch estimate of administrative costs at 3.7% of GDP and (ii) we impose 
a gradual achievement of the cost reduction for the 2006-10 period in 5% annual decrements, 
instead of imposing the entire reduction in 2005. 
Box 3: The WORLDSCAN model 
WorldScan is an applied computable general equilibrium model (CGE) for the world economy developed at the CPB, 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
29  It is a recursively dynamic model of the global economy with multi-
region and multi-sector detail, the regions being connected by bilateral trade flows at industry level. The model covers up to 
87 regions and 57 sectors providing considerable flexibility in showing regional and industry detail.  
WorldScan is a flexible model that has been developed to construct long-term scenarios for the global economy and to enable 
policy analyses in the field of international economics. Simulating certain economic developments may reveal important 
impacts on the world economy and identify related policy problems. Long-run scenarios have frequently been used as 
baselines for exploring the impacts of structural reforms and alternative policy options with WorldScan, for example in the 
fields of global warming, economic integration and trade. 
The core version of WorldScan is extended in separate directions to form dedicated versions, such as: a climate change 
version, a version with R&D spillovers, and a version with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Hence, the 
model has considerable flexibility in incorporating those economic mechanisms that are thought to be of most interest for 
specific policy applications. For the simulations presented in this paper, the appropriate version of WorldScan has been 
chosen with respect to the analytical context, namely the version with imperfect competition for the reduction in 
administrative burden and the version with R&D spillovers for the increase in R&D expenditure.  
WorldScan fits into the tradition of applied general equilibrium models building upon neoclassical theory. It has strong 
micro-foundations and explicitly determines simultaneous equilibrium on a large number of markets. The model is solved as 
an equation system and thus is cast in a CGE format. The mechanisms of the model are founded on empirical analysis where 
possible. Examples are the empirical foundation of R&D spillovers, non-tariff trade barriers, the degree of international 
capital mobility, savings rates, total factor productivity growth and projected labour supply. 
Economic growth in WorldScan can be targeted in scenarios through adjustments of primary inputs, such as labour, and the 
rate of technological change. In principle, the growth of total factor productivity is exogenous in WorldScan. However, 
productivity is affected endogenously if spillovers of R&D on productivity are introduced. Labour supply is exogenous and 
derived from demographic trends and projected rates of labour participation. Savings depend on the demographic 
composition of the population and the growth rate of per capita income. Investments are savings-led and capital mobility is 
internationally less than perfect. Hence, countries will face different real interest rates.  Regional households are guided by 
utility maximisation in buying goods and services. The model’s interregional linkages through trade in goods and services 
depend on customers’ demand for interregional varieties. Trade is impaired by formal barriers to trade and possibly by non-
tariff trade barriers as well. The government is part of the regional household, hence there is no need to impose the 
government budget to balance and all tax and tariff rates are exogenous. 
The dynamics of the model are determined as follows. Valued added grows by the increase of labour productivity and the rise 
of labour supply. Labour productivity is determined by technological progress and capital growth per unit of labour. 
Employment growth is exogenous, and derived from population growth, its age-composition, age-specific participation rates, 
and the unemployment rate. Hence, technological progress and the factors underlying labour supply are the main driving 
forces for diverging development patterns. 
 
Table 11 presents the administrative costs that occur to the private sector as percentage share 
of total GDP across Member States. These administrative costs only reflect the activities 
directly related to the compliance with information requirement contained in legislation (like 
                                                                                                                                                         
European Union. It has been developed at The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
(www.cpb.nl). 
29   For a more detailed description of the WorldScan model refer to the CPB document No. 111 (2006) from 
which this box has been derived (www.cpb.nl/eng/pub/cpbreeksen/document/111).     31
the time and effort in filling out forms), but do not reflect any kind of efficiency gains in 
associated production processes due to better regulation or the general elimination of 
legislation. Hence, the respective costs mainly comprise wages for employees and can be 
reduced, for example, through the avoidance of double reporting and the elimination of 
redundant/out-dated reporting. Table 1 indicates that administrative costs show a wide range 
of distribution across economies, but apparently the country values do not correlate with the 
economic size of a country or whether it is a new or old Member State. 
  
Table 11: Reduction of administrative costs and gains in labour efficiency 
Member State  Administrative costs 
share in GDP (in %)
1 
Labour costs share in 
value added (in %) 
Increase in labour 
efficiency ∆ eff (in %)
3 
Austria  4,6 51,3 2,2 
Belgium+Luxembourg  2,8 66,2 1,1 
Czech  republic  3,3 50,9 1,6 
Germany  3,7 57,4 1,6 
Denmark  1,9 62,5 0,8 
Spain  4,6 55,6 2,1 
Finland  1,5 53,6 0,7 
France  3,7 51,6 1,8 
UK  1,5 65,0 0,6 
Greece  6,8 59,5 2,9 
Hungary  6,8 48,3 3,5 
Ireland  2,4 57,2 1,1 
Italy  4,6 50,4 2,3 
Netherlands  3,7 56,9 1,6 
Poland  5,0 52,2 2,4 
Portugal  4,6 61,9 1,9 
Baltics + Malta + Cyprus  6,8  52,0  3,3 
Slovakia  4,6 44,8 2,6 
Slovenia  4,1 64,8 1,6 
Sweden  1,5 65,2 0,6 
EU-25
2  3,5 56,9 1,6 
1 Kox (2005). 
2 EU-25 figures are GDP-weighted averages. 
3 The increase in labour efficiency that corresponds to a 25% reduction in administrative burden to the private sector is computed as: 
∆ eff = 0.25 * (AdmCost / GDP) / (LabCost / GDP) 
 
where: ∆ eff  is the change in labour efficiency 
            AdmCost / GDP  is the share of administrative costs in total GDP 
            LabCost / GDP  is the share of labour costs in total GDP 
 
As described by Gelauff and Lejour (2006), administrative costs are assumed to mainly 
comprise wages and their reduction can therefore be interpreted as an increase in labour 
efficiency. The relative change not only depends on the initial size of the costs, but also on the 
labour cost share in total GDP at factor cost (value added), which in turn also varies 
considerably across Member States as shown in the second data column of Table 1. 
Consequently, the change in labour efficiency that would correspond to a 25% reduction of 
the administrative costs covers a wide range from 0.6% increase in the case of the United 
Kingdom to 3.5% in the case of Hungary. While the United Kingdom starts from the lowest 
administrative cost share and one of the highest labour cost shares among all Member States,     32
it is exactly the opposite for Hungary, which not only starts from high administrative costs 
relative to GDP, but also from a labour cost share in GDP at factor cost, which is some 15 
percentage points lower than for the top three Member States.  
5.2.2 Simulation results 
 
In the medium term the gains for the EU-25 are about 1.3% additional GDP in 2025 vis-à-vis 
the baseline scenario
30 in case that all Member States achieve the 25% reduction in 
administrative burden by 2010.
31,32 The potential gains by country range even further from 
0.5% to 2.6% of GDP in 2025 depending on their initial relative magnitude in administrative 
burden. Additional scenarios show that individual Member States can only gain through their 
own efforts in reducing the (in some cases very high) administrative costs for their private 
sector and not via spillovers from other Member States' reductions. However, given the 
potentially high administrative costs in some countries, Europe’s competitiveness vis-à-vis its 
trading partners very much depends on the joint effort by all Member States in working 
towards the Lisbon target of cutting red tape. 
 
6. The effect of increasing R&D expenditures 
 
In 2000, the Lisbon Council set a goal for increased R&D expenditure at 3% of GDP to be 
achieved in a decade. During the Spring Council in 2006, however, Member States have 
announced country-specific targets (cf. Table 12). This section quantifies the macroeconomic 
effects of increasing the R&D intensity according to the announced national targets. The new 
R&D expenditure targets set for 2010 by member states' show often far lower national targets 
than the 3% of GDP agreed upon in the Barcelona Summit in 2002. Greece (1.5%), Portugal 
(1.8%), Spain (2%) and Italy (2.5%) together with Ireland (2.5% by 2013) and UK (2.5% by 
2014) have scaled down their goals while the other MS have kept the original targets. The 
new goals require a 0.8 percentage point increase in the R&D intensity from its 2004 value of 
1.9% to the targeted average of 2.7%. 
 
                                                 
30   The baseline is the business-as-usual scenario reflecting the economic policies and the business environment 
in place in 2005. The base year is 2001 and the model is calibrated to the macro variables observed until 
2004. After 2005, the dynamics of the model result from demographics (population and aging), labour 
supply, technological change, and capital accumulation. In as such the baseline reflects a world with no 
changes in its policy environment throughout the modelling horizon until 2020. 
31   Given that WorldScan is a simulation model these results have to be interpreted as mere approximations. 
However, as opposed to many macro(-econometric) models, the analysis using WorldScan not only allows 
for an inspection of macroeconomic results for the aggregate EU-25 region, but also for the inspection of 
more disaggregated national and sectoral effects. 
32 The effect on GDP in 2010 (the final year of the gradual reduction of administrative costs between 2006 and 
2010) is about 0.1 percentage points lower then at the end of the simulation period (2025), which is due to 
the capital accumulation that follows the higher efficiency of labour. However, in this model version of 
WorldScan without explicit R&D investment decision by firms and R&D spillovers we do not observe the 
full effect of a 1.6% increase in labour efficiency until 2025. Note that all changes reported are level effects 
and not accumulative effects over time. Although these level effects do not vary substantially when 
comparing the final year of implementation (2010) and the terminal year of simulation (2025), we report 
results for 2025 to demonstrate the persistence of the positive effects of a perpetual reduction in the 
administrative burden.     33
6.1 QUEST II simulation results 
 
This exercise will concentrate only on the EU15 as a whole, and estimates the impact of 
reaching the newly announced national R&D targets in the framework of a semi-endogenous 
single-country version of the QUEST III model (see Box 4). Our simulation shows a 4.4 % 
GDP increase in 2025 relative to the baseline level if all EU15 MS achieve their target in 
2010. It is, nevertheless, important to note that the current version of the model cannot take 
into account the spillovers from non-EU15 countries, though it implicitly incorporates the 
spillovers within the EU15. Simulations with the multi-country QUEST II model show higher 
estimates. 
 
Box 4: A description of the QUEST III R&D-model 
 
In order to model the effect of R&D stimulating policies in the European Union an EU aggregate version of DG 
ECFIN's QUEST III model with endogenous R&D is used. R&D investment is introduced following the 
literature on semi-endogenous growth models (see Jones (1995)). The model distinguishes final, intermediate 
and R&D producing sectors. Final goods are produced in a monopolistically competitive environment using 
labour and intermediate inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas production function. The intermediate sector is 
composed of monopolistically competitive firms that purchase designs from the R&D sector. Designs are 
produced by an R&D sector via a knowledge production function using labour and the existing stock of 
knowledge. Technical progress is generated via the introduction of new goods based on designs produced in the 
R&D sector. Resources are mobile across these three sectors up to some adjustment costs and factors are 
rewarded according to their marginal efficiency. The QUEST III model provides a rich environment to model the 
R&D promoting fiscal policy measures taking into account the cost of higher R&D spending and subsidies. In 
the simulations presented here it is assumed that EU governments promote R&D expenditure by subsidising the 




Endogenous growth embraces an immense body of theoretical and empirical work that 
emerged in the 1980s. This paradigm distinguishes itself from the neoclassical model by 
emphasizing that economic growth is an endogenous outcome of the economic system, not 
the result of forces determined from outside. These theories are of interest to policymakers 
because they allow the discussion of policies to foster economic growth and they also allow 
the calculation of costs associated with higher R&D spending. In order to model the effect of 
R&D stimulating policies in the European Union, we augmented ECFIN QUEST III model 
with a semi-endogenous growth setting developed by Jones (1995, 2005). The model follows 
the aggregate version of the QUEST III model extended by an additional R&D sector 
providing new varieties of designs which increase the productivity in the final goods sector
33. 
The intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms that have 
purchased a design from the R&D sector. The R&D expenditures of intermediate sectors are 
interpreted as R&D investments. The QUEST III model provides a rich environment to model 
the R&D promoting fiscal policy measures. From the financing point of view, subsidies can 
be paid from tax revenues on consumption, on capital and labour income or on lump-sum 
taxes. From the expenditure side there are four possibilities to introduce R&D promoting 
subsidies: 1) subsidy on the wages paid by the R&D sector; 1) price subsidy on the R&D 
sector's products; 3) reduction of taxes paid by the R&D sector; 4) reduction of taxes paid by 
the intermediate sector. In the following simulation we will examine the effect of tax 
reduction favouring the intermediate sector where subsidies are financed by lump-sum taxes. 
                                                 
33   See Roeger at al (2007) for detailed description of the model.     34
 
 
6.1.2 Simulation  results 
 
We designed the simulation to gradually close the gap between the current R&D spending and 
the EU15 target by 2010. The applied policy measure for stimulating the R&D expenditures is 
a lump-sum tax financed subsidy in the form of tax-reduction to the intermediate sector which 
uses R&D products to introduce more goods in the market. We assume that the EU15 wants 
to maintain the achieved target between 2010 and 2020. This scenario is close to the one 
applied in the CPB simulations and the most appropriate for comparing the results. Table 1 
presents the simulation results on GDP, consumption, total factor productivity, total and R&D 
employment at EU15 level in 2025. The simulation shows a 4.4% increase in GDP relative to 
the baseline under the implied conditions. Consumption goes up by 5.2 % and real wage 
increases by 5.1 %. Employment devoted to research activities must increase by 40 percent in 
order to reach the target. This result is in line with the findings of Sheenan and Wyckoff 
(2003) which estimated that in order to reach the Lisbon R&D targets, the EU15 needs to 
employ 30% to 60% additional researchers. It is important to note that we do not analyse the 
feasibility of the modified national targets, therefore we do not model whether it is possible to 
increase the R&D personnel by 40% within a decade as the national programs would require 
it or not. Although total factor productivity is increasing by 7.6 percent, GDP is up by only 
4.4 percent. This gap is explained by the proportional decrease in capital and labour input
34. 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic impact of R&D targets 
 
Year Y  C  L  LRD  K  TFP  WR 
2025  4,4  5,2  -0,7 40,0 -2,2  7,6  5,1 
 
Source: QUESTRD simulations. Y: GDP, C: consumption, L: total employment, LRD: R&D employment, K: 
Capital, TFP: total factor productivity, WR: real wages. Results are per cent deviations from baseline levels.  
 
6.1.3 Comparison with exogenous growth version of QUEST model 
 
Studies that measure the impact of R&D intensity on total factor productivity have generally 
shown larger benefits in GDP, but those simulations exclude financing costs. Recent QUEST 
simulations based on the multicountry, exogenous growth version of QUEST and using the 
TFP estimations from ULB (2006) provided larger results closer to the upper bound of the 
CPB estimations showing around 7% GDP increase for Germany in case of reaching the 
national target in time for 2020. GreenMod simulations showed even higher, 8.8% GDP 
increase for Germany
35. The present semi-endogenous version of QUEST does not take into 
account the spillover effects from non-EU15 countries, therefore it can still represent a lower-
bound scenario compared to the case when all EU25 countries can achieve their national 
targets by 2010. 
 
                                                 
34   If we change to inelastic labour supply as in Gelauf and Lejour (2006) and neutralize the impact on labour, 
we would get proportionally higher effect on GDP (around 5 %). 
35   See ULB (2006). The simulations were carried out only for Germany, France, Italy, Spain and UK, therefore 
the possible spillovers from other EU countries could probably still increase these estimates.     35
 
6.2 WorldScan simulation results 
 
This exercise provides an update on Lejour et al. (2006) and Gelauff and Lejour (2006) who 
analyse, using the WorldScan
36 model, a proportional increase of all national R&D 
expenditure based on the overall EU target of 3%.
37 We therefore re-estimate the effects of all 
Member States achieving the self-set targets on R&D expenditure by 2010. Furthermore, we 
compare the results with the estimates for a second scenario, in which all Member States 
achieve the announced targets, but with a certain delay that corresponds to the relative effort 
individual Member States are facing in achieving their respective goal.  
Our expectation of a delay in achieving the self-set targets on R&D expenditure are in line 
with earlier studies by the European Commission (cf. Arundel and Hollanders, 2005). The 
study results suggest that a sufficient increase in business R&D expenditure (BERD), which 
are assumed to contribute two-third to the overall 3% target, is rather unlikely to be achieved 
by 2010. Only under a very ambitious scenario based on the highest observed growth rates for 
all 13 countries studied, a 2% BERD intensity would be reached as early as 2015. 
6.2.1 Methodology 
 
Our analysis is of a “What If” type, which means that we only calculate the consequences of 
policy measures, but do not make an evaluation of the feasibility of these measures and the 
corresponding costs of realizing them. As can be seen from Table 1, the level of R&D 
expenditure across Member States in 2004 is extremely diverse ranging from half a percent to 
almost four percent. Although Member States with lower levels have in general announced 
more modest targets for 2010, the additional R&D expenditure to be achieved in percentage 
points of GDP also vary substantially between 0.3% and 1.4%. The relative increase of these 
additional R&D expenditure with respect to the 2004 levels thus range from 7% to 240% 
illustrating the tremendous effort that some Member States are facing in reaching their targets. 
However, we acknowledge that it is potentially easier for a small economy to achieve a 
certain percentage point increase in R&D expenditure than it is for a larger economy 
(especially considering the additional financing, scientific personnel, and innovative ideas as 
well as the decrease in marginal return to R&D expenditure). Therefore, we adjust the relative 
increase in R&D expenditure using logarithmic values of the individual countries’ GDP that 
range from 0.67 for the smallest to 1.64 for the largest economy to determine the relative 
effort in achieving the self-set R&D expenditure target. We then assume that the three 
Member States with the lowest relative effort achieve their target in 2010, while all other 
Member States achieve their respective target between 2011 and 2020 depending on the 
magnitude of relative effort they have to master. By doing so, we impose a neutral assessment 
and acknowledgement of the effort ahead of each Member State and the community as a 
                                                 
36    The WorldScan version applied for the R&D simulations features endogenous firm decision on R&D 
spending and R&D spillovers. It has been developed at The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (www.cpb.nl). 
37   Gelauff and Lejour (2006) implement the increase by setting an upper limit to R&D expenditure of 4.5% of 
GDP and a gradual increase of R&D expenditure from 2005 to 2010 decreasing the gap between actual 
R&D expenditure shares in 2004 and the announced country targets for 2010 such that the increases are 
proportional across Member States and in sum reach the community target of 3%.     36
whole, where individual economies will have to compete not only for financial, but also (and 
maybe more importantly) for human capital. 
 























Austria  2,3 3,0 33 1,15  0,38  2011 
Belgium+Luxembourg  1,9 3,0 57 1,20  0,68  2013 
Czech republic  1,3 2,1 61 0,91  0,55  2012 
Germany  2,5 3,0 20 1,64  0,34  2011 
Denmark  2,6 3,0 15 1,11  0,17  2010 
Spain  1,1 2,0 87 1,40  1,22  2015 
Finland  3,5 4,0 14 1,06  0,15  2010 
France  2,2 3,0 39 1,57  0,61  2012 
UK  1,8 2,5 40 1,59  0,63  2012 
Greece  0,6 1,5 159 1,06  1,68  2018 
Hungary  0,9 1,8 102 0,89  0,91  2014 
Ireland  1,2 2,5 108 1,04  1,13  2015 
Italy  1,1 2,5 119 1,53  1,82  2018 
Netherlands  1,8 3,0 69 1,29  0,90  2014 
Poland  0,6 1,7 184 1,15  2,12  2020 
Portugal  0,8 1,8 131 1,03  1,35  2016 
Baltics + Malta + Cyprus  0,6 1,6 164 0,83  1,36  2016 
Slovakia  0,5 1,8 240 0,69  1,65  2017 
Slovenia  1,6 3,0 86 0,67  0,58  2012 
Sweden  3,7 4,0  7  1,18  0,08  2010 
EU-25
3  1,9  2,7  58     0,81    
1 Source: Presidency Conclusion of the Brussels European Council 23/24 March 2006, Annex 1 
2 IE target for 2013, PL target for 2008, UK target for 2014 
3 EU-25 figures are GDP-weighted averages 
4 Relative effort = Relative increase in R&D expenditure * log100[GDP] /100 
5 We choose the relative effort of DK (0.17) as cut-off point. Consequently, DK, FI, and SE are assumed to achieve their 
respective target in 2010. All other Member States are spread proportionally to their relative effort beyond the cut-off point 
between 2011 and 2020. 
 
Table 12 presents the R&D expenditure in % of GDP as reported for 2004 (data column 1), 
the announced targets for 2010 (data column 2) and the relative increase it takes to achieve 
the target (data column 3). We use this relative increase and the relative (logarithmic) country 
size (data column 4)—which is distributed around 1—to determine the relative effort (data 
column 5) it takes the individual Member States to achieve their respective target. Taking into 
account this relative effort, we assign, for the second scenario, new potential years of 
achievement (data column 6). 
6.2.2 Simulation results 
 
Table 13 presents the immediate effects of increased R&D expenditure for the EU as a whole 
and a number of selected countries. The choice of countries was based on GDP size and trade 
openness. Germany is with 33% imports plus exports over GDP the most open of the largest 
five EU economies, while the United Kingdom is (with 25%) less open. The Czech Republic     37
as a medium size EU economy is extremely open (71%), while Poland’s trade openness 
(27%) is at comparable levels with the UK. We also selected Sweden as a representative of 
the group of Member States with the best performance in R&D expenditure levels and the 
lowest relative effort in achieving their announced targets (DK, FI, SE). Apart from the results 
for the two scenarios described above, the individual country blocks in Table 13 also present 
the results for comparative scenarios, in which only the respective country increases R&D 
expenditures as in the first scenario, but no other Member State.  
 
Table 13: Impact of higher R&D expenditure on productivity (% changes in levels from the 




(∆ in % of 
GDP) 
R&D stock  Total factor 
productivity 
Share of R&D 
in total GDP 










EU  1,1 50,4 1,9  0,7  4,4  5,5 
 - delay  1,1  47,3  1,8  0,7  4,2  5,3 
Czech Republic  0,9 61,8 2,7  0,5  4,7  5,3 
 - delay  0,9  60,0  2,5  0,5  4,4  5,0 
 - only  0,9  60,8  1,4  0,5  2,1  2,8 
Germany  1,0 33,9 1,4  0,6  3,8  4,1 
 - delay  1,0  33,4  1,4  0,6  3,7  4,0 
 - only  1,0  33,5  0,9  0,6  2,7  3,1 
United Kingdom  0,8 33,5 1,2  0,5  3,5  3,4 
 - delay  0,8  34,8  1,2  0,5  3,5  3,4 
 - only  0,8  33,2  0,9  0,5  2,6  2,3 
Poland  1,1  139,5  3,1 0,6 5,1 5,5 
 - delay  1,1  104,0  2,6  0,6  4,3  4,6 
 - only  1,1  138,8  2,5  0,6  4,0  4,2 
Sweden  0,5 7,2 0,9 0,3 2,3 3,1 
  -  delay  0,5 7,2 0,9 0,3 2,2 3,1 
  -  only  0,5 6,8 0,3 0,3 0,8 1,4 
Note: The first row of each country block presents results for the first scenario, i.e. all MS achieve their target in 2010 (except 
for IE in 2013, PL in 2008 and UK in 2014. The rows "delay" presents results for the second scenario using the potential 
years of achievement for all MS. The rows "only" present results for additional scenarios, in which only the respective 
country increases R&D expenditure as in the first scenario, while all other MS do not increase their R&D expenditure. 
 
The increased R&D expenditure raise EU-25 R&D capital stock levels in 2020 by 50% if all 
countries achieve their target by 2010 (or as announce). If the achievement of the targets is 
delayed and occurs only gradually between 2010 and 2020, the effect is slightly dampened to 
47%, accounting for the compound effects in capital accumulation. The increase in R&D 
stocks, however, not only differs substantially across individual countries, but for some 
Member States also when comparing the two speeds of achievement. Given the high initial 
R&D expenditure level and the already high R&D stock level of Sweden, the increase in 
stocks is rather small. Germany and the UK manage to increase their already well-developed 
stocks by one third, which is considerable. Poland, on the other hand, more than doubles its 
R&D stocks until 2020 vis-à-vis the baseline and the speed of achievement clearly matters. 
While achieving the target in 2010 leads to an increase in R&D stocks of 140%, the delayed 
achievement in 2020 reduced the increase of stocks to 104%, which makes a substantial 
difference in achieving R&D stocks by 2020 that support an innovative and internationally 
competitive economy.      38
The improvements in total factor productivity mainly follow the relative increases in R&D 
stocks. The only substantial difference between the two different speeds of adjustments occurs 
in the case of Poland with half a percentage point. Most interestingly, the results for the 
scenarios where only individual countries increase their R&D expenditure reveal the 
substantial spillovers that stem from the joint efforts by all Member States in achieving their 
R&D targets. These spillovers are largely linked to the trade openness of the respective 
economy. For the Czech Republic, for example, additional TFP growth as compared to the 
baseline in 2020 would only be half in the “Czech only” scenario (1.4%) of what it will be in 
the case when all Member States achieve their targets in 2010 (2.7%).  
Table 13 also presents the percentage point shifts in the share of the R&D sector in total GDP, 
which are quite substantial. Furthermore, the table reports on the labour productivity gains 
realized in the medium and high tech industry sectors, which benefit the most from increased 
R&D stocks as compared to other sectors (4.4% and 5.5% respectively for the EU-25). The 
results show that increased R&D expenditure and the enhanced accumulation of R&D capital 
stocks will have a remarkable impact on the potential performance and the international 
competitiveness of some key European industry sectors. 
Table 14 presents the main results concerning the alternative speeds of achievement of the 
R&D target. The level of GDP for the EU as a whole will be 2.6% higher in 2025 if all 
Member States achieve their targets by 2010. At aggregate EU level, the delay in achieving 
the target is notable, but not substantial, mainly because some large economies are achieving 
their target rather early even in the delayed scenario (cf. DE, FR and UK in Table 12). At 
individual country level, however, the differences are substantial for those Member States 
who face the largest effort in achieving their target, which for the group of countries shown is 
the case for Poland (3.6% vs. 2.8%).  
While a delay in R&D performance does not change the economic performance of some EU 
economies (cf. DE, UK, and SE in Table 3), achieving their respective target alone matters a 
lot, as already suggested by the declines in total factor productivity discussed above (cf. Table 
13). In the case of the Czech Republic, 40% of the additional GDP gain in 2025 is due to 
spillovers that occur if all Member States achieve their targets jointly (3.3% vs. 1.9%). For 
Germany the spillovers account still for 25% of the overall gains in GDP, while for the UK 
and Poland it is less than 20%. Given the relatively low effort Sweden needs to undertake 
itself, the economy will mostly gain through spillovers from an EU-wide achievement of the 
R&D targets accounting for more than 60% of the country’s additional GDP in 2025.  
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Table 14: Impact of higher R&D expenditure on main economic performance indicators (% 
changes in levels from the baseline for 2025 unless indicated otherwise) 
   GDP  Consumption  Exports  Real wages 
EU  2,6 1,0 4,8 2,4 
 - delay  2,4  0,9  4,6  2,3 
Czec Republic  3,3 1,9 5,0 3,4 
 - delay  3,1  1,7  4,7  3,2 
 - only  1,9  0,5  2,5  1,8 
Germany  2,3 0,8 4,4 2,1 
 - delay  2,3  0,8  4,2  2,1 
 - only  1,7  0,2  3,1  1,4 
United Kingdom  1,7 0,6 3,7 1,6 
 - delay  1,7  0,6  3,8  1,6 
 - only  1,4  0,2  3,0  1,2 
Poland  3,6 1,8 5,2 3,4 
 - delay  2,8  1,5  4,4  2,7 
 - only  3,0  1,2  3,7  2,8 
Sweden  1,1 0,7 2,3 1,1 
 - delay  1,1  0,6  2,3  1,0 
 - only  0,4  0,0  0,9  0,3 
Note: The first row of each country block presents results for the first scenario, i.e. all MS achieve their target in 2010 (except 
for IE in 2013, PL in 2008 and UK in 2014. The rows "delay" presents results for the second scenario using the potential 
years of achievement for all MS. The rows "only" present results for additional scenarios, in which the respective country 
only increases R&D expenditure as in the first scenario, while all other MS do not increase their R&D expenditure. 
 
The gains not only occur through the R&D spillovers directly, but also through a general 
improvement of Europe’s terms of trade vis-à-vis its international trading partners. The 
increase in international competitiveness is evident from the higher relative increases in 
exports as compared to overall GDP growth. Higher R&D expenditure lead to innovative and 
more efficient production processes that are particularly characterised by increased labour 
efficiency. However, these gains in efficiency apply to the entire economy and through factor 
movements across sectors also to all production processes. Hence the sectors that have the 
highest export shares are particularly favoured since their efficiency gains not only work vis-
à-vis other sectors of the domestic economy, but in particular vis-à-vis their respective world 
markets. The extent of the increase in comparative advantage will of course diminish if other 
non-European economies also increase their R&D performance and consequently their own 
labour efficiency.  
Overall, the welfare gains for European citizens are considerable. Productivity gains through 
increase efficiency are translated into higher real wages that are proportional to the gains in 
GDP (which approximately coincides with national income). However, due to the higher 
investment demand (through increased R&D expenditure) the increase in private consumption 
is markedly lower than the growth in GDP. Nevertheless, the citizens in New Member States 
in particular gain almost an additional 2% in terms of consumption on top of the improved 
economic developments in the baseline. Noteworthy, the additional economic gains from 
spillovers directly translate into higher consumption as they do not require any additional 
investment.
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38   Note that the percentage point differences between the first scenario and the respective “country only” 
scenario are about the same for GDP and Consumption (e.g. for the Czech Republic 3.3-1.9=1.4 for GDP 
and 1.9-0.5=1.4 for Consumption).     40
From the analysis above we conclude that despite the enormous efforts European economies 
have to undertake in achieving their individual as well as the joint community target in R&D 
expenditure, the economic gains will be considerable. First and foremost improved economic 
performance will be generated through developments in the medium and high tech sectors, 
which gain the most from R&D-driven innovations. Given the high export shares of these 
sectors and the relative improvements in labour efficiency vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the 
gains trough improved international competitiveness are substantial.
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Additional gains through spillovers across European economies are substantial and confirm 
the need for joint efforts among all EU Member States in achieving their respective R&D 
targets. The welfare gains for EU citizens are substantial across all Member States, but 
particularly pronounced for those economies, which (i) start from a relatively low level of 
R&D stocks, (ii) have to master the highest effort in achieving the set R&D targets, and (iii) 
are characterized by a high degree of trade openness. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The results of the modelling exercise presented in this paper confirm the potential of the 
structural reforms which make part of the GJS to significantly boost growth and contribute to 
generating jobs. The exercise is certainly not an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of reforms falling under the heading of the GSJ, however. There are numerous 
reform areas that are important for boosting growth and employment, such as enhancing 
quality of human capital or completing the integration of European financial markets, which 
were not included in the simulations undertaken for this paper. Similarly, it was not possible 
to give full justice to all measures undertaken within the individual areas, such as active 
labour market policies or life-long learning schemes, and thus the reported effects should be 
seen as lower bounds of the actual impacts. 
This exercise was undertaken as background for the annual assessment exercise of the GJS 
and fed into the 2007 Annual Progress Report of the Commission.
40 As a follow-up to this 
first attempt, the Commission services intend to continue developing their modelling capacity 
in the field of structural reforms and expand the simulations in several directions.  
First, there is a significant scope for a more refined specification of inputs into the models. 
Arguably, the reliability of the modelling results crucially depends on the policy shocks that 
are fed into the models. In the academic literature, it is common to define stylised shocks to 
exogenous variables such as TFP or mark-up which are considered as the main transition 
                                                 
39   It needs to be kept in mind that this analysis assumes R&D expenditure of other economies not to increase 
beyond their general developments in the baseline. An increase in other world regions would clearly 
diminish the gains from R&D expenditures in Europe, especially those following from enhanced export 
performance. A respective analysis would be particularly interesting in the context of the further emerging 
of the economies of China and India, but this aspect is clearly beyond the scope of the current analysis. On 
the other hand, one should consider that although R&D investments in this modelling framework do have an 
impact on total factor productivity and in as such capture technological progress in a stylized manner, they 
neither lead to an actual shift in technologies (new generations of production technologies) nor to the 
development of new products (only new varieties of existing products). In as such, the modelling framework 
applied does not capture the full dynamics of the R&D investment and innovation process. Consequently, 
the potential gains from R&D investments in this analysis may be underestimated in comparison to the 
actual potential benefits. 
40   http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual-report-1206_en.htm     41
channels of structural reforms and to explore the steady-state outcome as well as adjustment 
dynamics. However, the assessment of the Lisbon structural reform agenda requires 
modelling of effects of concrete reforms, either already implemented or foreseen. Effects of 
some reform measures can be modelled directly (e.g. a tax reform can be modelled in a 
straightforward way in a model which contains a rich enough description of the government 
sector). However, impact of other reforms can only be simulated indirectly through 
establishing a link with the exogenous variables in the models.  
The future work can improve the reliability of the simulation results either through explicit 
modelling of reform or improvements in the background analysis specifying the link between 
reforms and exogenous variables. Both of the approaches can, in any case, benefit from better 
information on structural reforms which have been implemented by Member States. Such 
information is still relatively scarce but there has been significant progress recently. For 
example, the LABREF database (Arpaia et al., 2005) developed by the European Commission 
in cooperation with Member States provides a comprehensive and consistent information on 
labour market reforms implemented in the EU25 in the period 2000-2006. 
Second, there is scope to broaden the coverage of the simulations by including other reform 
areas. The modelling options are increasing with the continuous development of the 
modelling tools. Therefore, a wider range of issues can be explored with their help. For 
example, a deeper analysis of various reforms in European labour markets can prove very 
useful for policy considerations. Similarly, as policies to enhance human capital or promote 
production and use of ICT have potentially significant impact on growth and employment 
more detailed analysis of these issues is highly relevant. Other possibility might be to extend 
our understanding of implications of reforms in the environmental field such as energy and 
climate change. 
Finally, there is a considerable scope to explore specific aspects of structural reforms. 
Recently, economic literature has started to pay increased attention to the issues of 
interlinkages and complementarities between reforms. This debate revives the "second best" 
theory in predicting that only comprehensive and well-designed packages of reforms can 
unambiguously deliver increases in social welfare. Large macroeconomic general equilibrium 
models are suitable tools to examine these issues allowing analysis of (packages of) reforms 
across areas and across countries. In addition, such analysis can provide insights into the 
interactions between the EU-wide policies and those conducted at national level.     42
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Appendix A: Table 2A 
Table 2  
Policy induced changes in the unemployment rate  
  specification 1    specification 2    specification 3    specification 4 
 URT1564 policy+ogap  policy    URT1564  policy+ogap policy    URT1564 policy+ogap policy    URT1564  policy+ogap  policy 
AUS    -2.4  -2.3  -1.4   -2.4  -2.0  -1.1   -2.4  -1.8  -1.0    -2.4  -1.7  -0.7 
AUT    0.6  -0.9  -1.4   0.6  -0.8  -1.3   0.6  -1.8  -2.3    0.6  0.1  -0.4 
BEL    -1.7  -1.1  -1.0   -1.7  -1.5  -1.3   -1.7  -0.4  -0.2    -1.7  -0.7  -0.5 
CAN    -1.8  -1.0  -0.4   -1.8  -1.5  -0.9   -1.8  -1.1  -0.5    -1.8  -1.4  -0.7 
CHE    0.8  -1.2  -0.6   0.8  -1.1  -0.5   0.8  -1.3  -0.8    0.8  -0.6  0.0 
DEU    1.2  -1.7  -2.2   1.2  -1.6  -2.1   1.2  -1.2  -1.7    1.2  -0.7  -1.3 
DNK    -1.6  -3.0  -3.2   -1.6  -2.0  -2.2   -1.6  -3.2  -3.4    -1.6  -1.2  -1.4 
ESP    -11.5  -3.8  -2.5   -11.5  -3.7  -2.4   -11.5  -4.6  -3.4    -11.5  -2.4  -1.0 
FIN    -6.5  -5.2  -1.7   -6.5  -5.1  -1.6   -6.5  -5.5  -2.1    -6.5  -4.7  -0.8 
FRA    -1.9  -0.6  -0.7   -1.9  -0.6  -0.7   -1.9  -0.7  -0.8    -1.9  -0.9  -1.0 
GBR    -3.9  -3.5  -3.0   -3.9  -3.3  -2.8   -3.9  -3.3  -2.8    -3.9  -1.0  -0.4 
IRL    -7.9  -7.1  -5.1   -7.9  -7.0  -5.0   -7.9  -7.2  -5.3    -7.9  -3.7  -1.4 
ITA    -2.9  -2.6  -2.3   -2.9  -4.9  -4.6   -2.9  -1.3  -1.0    -2.9  -0.3  0.1 
JPN   2.2  2.7  1.3    2.2  2.4  0.9   2.2  2.7  1.3  2.2  1.1  -0.5 
NLD    -2.8  -0.4  -1.5   -2.8  -0.4  -1.5   -2.8  -0.2  -1.3    -2.8  -0.9  -2.1 
NOR    -0.5  0.5  0.7   -0.5  0.4  0.6   -0.5  0.5  0.7    -0.5  -0.4  -0.2 
NZL    -1.6  -1.2  -1.2   -1.6  -1.0  -1.1   -1.6  -1.2  -1.2    -1.6  -0.9  -0.9 
PRT    -0.8  -0.5  -1.5   -0.8  -0.7  -1.7   -0.8  -0.6  -1.6    -0.8  0.4  -0.7 
SWE    -3.3  -2.4  -1.3   -3.3  -2.4  -1.3   -3.3  -2.3  -1.2    -3.3  -1.9  -0.7 
USA    0.4  -2.4  -2.5   0.4  -2.2  -2.3   0.4  -2.4  -2.4    0.4  0.4  0.3 
                             
Unweighted 
average oecd  -2.3  -1.9  -1.6   -2.3  -2.0  -1.6   -2.3  -1.9  -1.6    -2.3  -1.1  -0.7 
Unweighted 
EU average   -3.0  -2.4  -2.0   -3.0  -2.5  -2.1   -3.0  -2.4  -2.0    -3.0  -1.3  -0.8 
weighted EU 
average  -2.7  -2.2  -2.1   -2.7  -2.5  -2.3   -2.7  -2.0  -1.9    -2.7  -1.0  -0.8 
 
Source: Own's calculation on Bassanini and Duval (2006) data. 
Note: The first column reports the change in the actual unemployment between 1995 and 2003; the second column reports the contribution of policy variables and of the output 
gap to the change in the unemployment rate; the third columns reports the contribution of policy variable.     45 
 






















                     
AUT -0.11  -0.38  0.00  -0.93  0.00  0.51           -1.4 
BEL 0.4  -0.3  0.0  -1.1  0.0  -0.2            -1.0 
CHE 0.4  -0.4  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -0.5            -0.6 
DEU 0.1  -1.1  0.0  -1.2  0.0  0.5           -2.2 
DNK -1.9  -0.2  0.0  -1.1  0.0 0.2           -3.2 
ESP -0.6  -0.7  0.0  -1.3  0.0  -1.3           -2.5 
FIN 0.0  -1.3  0.0  -0.4  0.0  -3.5            -1.7 
FRA 0.2  0.1  0.0  -1.1  0.0  0.1           -0.7 
GBR -0.2  -2.4  0.0  -0.4  0.0  -0.5           -3.0 
IRL 1.4  -5.7  0.0  -0.8  0.0  -2.0            -5.1 
ITA 1.7  -2.6  0.0  -1.4  0.0  -0.3            -2.3 
NLD 0.0  -0.3  0.0  -1.2  0.0  1.1           -1.5 
PRT 0.7  -0.8  0.0  -1.3  0.0  1.0           -1.5 
SWE -0.3  -0.4  0.0  -0.6  0.0  -1.1           -1.3 
EU Un-weighted 
average 0.12  -1.24  0.00  -0.99  0.00  -0.41            
EU weighted  
average  0.21 -1.23  0  -1.04  0  -0.12            -2.1 
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AUT 0.0  -0.4  0.2  -1.0  0.0  0.5  -0.1 0.0  0.0      -1.3 
BEL 0.0  -0.3  0.0  -1.2  0.0  -0.2  0.0 0.2  0.0      -1.3 
CHE 0.0  -0.4  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0      -0.5 
DEU 0.0  -1.1  0.2  -1.3  0.0  0.5 0.1  0.0  0.0      -2.1 
DNK  0.0  -0.2  0.1  -1.3  0.0  0.2  -0.4  -0.5 0.1    -2.2 
ESP  0.0  -0.6  0.1  -1.4  0.0  -1.3  -0.3  -0.1 0.0    -2.4 
FIN 0.0  -1.2  0.0  -0.4  0.0  -3.5  0.0 0.0  0.0      -1.6 
FRA 0.0  0.1  0.0  -1.2  0.0  0.1  0.3 0.0  0.0      -0.7 
GBR 0.0  -2.3  0.1  -0.4  0.0  -0.5  -0.3 0.2  0.0      -2.8 
IRL 0.0  -5.5  0.3  -0.9  0.0  -2.0  0.6 0.4  0.1      -5.0 
ITA  0.0  -2.5  0.1  -1.6  0.0  -0.3  3.8  -1.8 -2.7   -4.6 
NLD 0.0  -0.3  0.1  -1.4  0.0  1.1  0.1 0.0  0.0      -1.5 
PRT 0.0  -0.8  0.1  -1.5  0.0  1.0  0.4 0.1  0.0      -1.7 
SWE 0.0  -0.4  0.2  -0.7  0.0  -1.1  -0.4 0.0  0.0      -1.3 
EU un-weighted 
average 0.00  -1.19  0.12  -1.11  0.00 -0.41  0.30  -0.12  -0.19       
EU weighted 
average  0.00 -1.19  0.11  -1.16  0.00  -0.12 0.53  -0.24  -0.37      -2.3 
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AUT -0.1  -0.4  0.0  -1.1  0.0 0.5       -0.7  0.0 -2.3 
BEL 0.4  -0.3  0.0  -1.3  0.0  -0.2        0.1  0.9 -0.2 
CHE 0.4  -0.4  0.0  -0.8  0.0  -0.5        0.0  0.0 -0.8 
DEU 0.1  -1.1  0.0  -1.5  0.0  0.5       0.0  0.7 -1.7 
DNK -1.9  -0.2  0.0  -1.4  0.0 0.2       0.0 0.0  -3.4 
ESP -0.6  -0.6  0.0  -1.6  0.0  -1.3       -0.5  -0.1 -3.4 
FIN 0.0  -1.2  0.0  -0.5  0.0  -3.4        -0.4  0.0 -2.1 
FRA 0.2  0.1  0.0  -1.3  0.0  0.1       0.2  0.0 -0.8 
GBR -0.2  -2.3  0.0  -0.5  0.0  -0.4       0.2  -0.1 -2.8 
IRL 1.4  -5.5  0.0  -1.0  0.0  -2.0        0.0  -0.2  -5.3 
ITA 1.7  -2.5  0.0  -1.7  0.0  -0.3        0.0  1.5  -1.0 
NLD 0.0  -0.3  0.0  -1.5  0.0  1.1       0.0  0.5 -1.3 
PRT 0.7  -0.8  0.0  -1.6  0.0  1.0       0.0  0.2 -1.6 
SWE -0.3  -0.4  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -1.1       0.0 0.2  -1.2 
EU un-weighted 
average 0.12  -1.19  0.00  -1.21  0.00 -0.41        -0.09 0.28   
EU weighted 
average  0.21 -1.19  0.00  -1.27  0.00  -0.12       -0.01  0.40  -1.9 
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AUT -0.1  0.4  0.0  -0.8  0.0 0.6           -0.4 
BEL 0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.9  0.0  -0.2            -0.5 
CHE 0.3  0.3  0.0  -0.6  0.0  -0.6            0.0 
DEU 0.1  -0.4  0.0  -1.0  0.0  0.6           -1.3 
DNK -1.2  0.8 0.0  -0.9  0.0 0.2           -1.4 
ESP -0.4  0.5  0.0  -1.1  0.0  -1.5           -1.0 
FIN 0.0  -0.4  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -4.0            -0.8 
FRA 0.2  -0.3  0.0  -0.9  0.0  0.2           -1.0 
GBR -0.1  0.0 0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.5           -0.4 
IRL 0.9  -1.6  0.0  -0.7  0.0  -2.3            -1.4 
ITA 1.2  0.1  0.0  -1.2  0.0  -0.4            0.1 
NLD 0.0  -1.1  0.0  -1.0  0.0  1.3           -2.1 
PRT 0.4  0.0  0.0  -1.1  0.0  1.1           -0.7 
SWE -0.2  0.0 0.0  -0.5  0.0  -1.2           -0.7 
EU un-weighted 
average 0.08  -0.15 0.00  -0.83  0.00 -0.47             
EU weighted 
average  0.14 -0.12  0.00  -0.87  0.00  -0.13            -0.8 
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Appendix B: Production in the QUEST III Model 
 
Output (Y) is produced with capital (K) and labour (L). Firms make decisions on capital and 
labour as well as the degree of capacity utilisation (UCAP). They also have to use a fraction 
of their employees for administrative tasks (overhead labour: LO) which are not productive. 
The variable U represents the level of technology. The production function is Cobb Douglas 









In the following we show that a reduction in over head labour ( 0 < ∆LO ) reduces the 
marginal product of labour (keeping K and U fixed) but increases average labour. This can be 





















A reduction of LO increases the denominator of (2). An intuitive explanation for this is that a 
reduction of fixed costs reduces the scale elasticity of production. A reduction of overhead 
labour does, however, increase the average productivity of labour. This can be seen from 
expression (3), which defines average productivity in terms of the inputs used for production. 
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An intuitive explanation is that overhead labour is completely unproductive. Reducing LO 
allows producing the same level of output with fewer workers. Finally notice, employment 
decisions by firms are made by equating the marginal value product of workers to the real 




















Here, the variable mup is the mark up that is charged by firms on the product market. As can 
be seen from equation (4), the direct effect of reducing overhead labour on total labour 
demand is negative. The negative effect may however be compensated by an increase in 
competition, i. e. a reduction in the mark up. 
 